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ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS
Luis Inaraja Vera*
Abstract
In recent years, government agencies have increasingly relied on
voluntary programs to achieve a variety of goals, from improving worker
safety to creating healthier living conditions in urban areas. This type of
government initiative is based on a bargain between the agency and
private citizens: the government provides certain incentives—economic or
otherwise—and private actors voluntarily adopt behaviors that benefit the
public. One example is cleaning up a contaminated site and building an
affordable housing project.
While agencies have made substantial progress since the creation of
the first voluntary programs, much work remains. To move forward in this
area, and especially with voluntary environmental programs, two critical
questions must be answered: First, how should we evaluate the
performance of voluntary environmental programs? And second, how do
we determine the appropriate level of government—federal, state, or
local—that should be in charge of implementing them? These two
questions have not been satisfactorily addressed to date.
This Article addresses these lingering questions by evaluating the
performance of a sophisticated local voluntary cleanup program. The
resulting analysis uncovers some of the shortcomings in how agencies and
scholars have previously assessed voluntary programs, yielding four
contributions to the literature. First, the Article offers a deeper
understanding of how data can and should affect the design and
improvement of regulatory programs. Second, the examination of a local
voluntary cleanup program provides much-needed empirical support for
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a common argument raised in the environmental federalism literature:
that the need to tailor programs to local conditions can justify a strong
municipal role. The need for a strong local government is especially
important where state legislation creates what this Article refers to as
“local regulatory gaps.” Third, while efficiency is a desirable feature of
any government initiative, it becomes a necessity in the context of
voluntary programs. Delays and other inefficiencies in the operation of a
voluntary program can deter potential enrollees from participating in it.
Without enrollees, voluntary cleanup programs simply cannot operate.
Lastly, injecting unnecessary complexity into the design of voluntary
programs by trying to address too many policy challenges at once can be
counterproductive.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law at the federal and state levels is becoming increasingly
sophisticated, as the growing popularity of voluntary or incentives programs
suggests.1 Consider hazardous substance contamination, one of the most important
environmental problems of our time.2 Both legislatures and agencies have adopted
1

See Xiang Bi & Madhu Khanna, Reassessment of the Impact of the EPA’s Voluntary
33/50 Program on Toxic Releases, 88 LAND ECON. 341, 341 (2012) (pointing out that,
starting in the 1990s, voluntary programs have gained traction compared to more traditional
command-and-control regulation); infra Section I.A (explaining the evolution of
environmental regulatory tools and the emergence of voluntary programs).
2
Contaminated sites can cause a variety of problems ranging from urban sprawl to
serious public health concerns. See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 59 (1999) (noting that
avoiding brownfields leads to sprawl). Communities in areas with a higher density of
contaminated properties experience higher mortality rates resulting from the increased
likelihood of suffering different types of health problems. See, e.g., Jill S. Litt et al.,
Examining Urban Brownfields Through the Public Health “Macroscope,” 110.2 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 183, 189 (2002); see also infra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text
(addressing the magnitude of this problem).
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groundbreaking tools to tackle this environmental challenge. The main federal
statute designed to address existing hazardous substance contamination, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA or the Superfund Law),3 has been described by scholars as the “most farreaching of all the environmental statutes” and one that “transformed environmental
law.”4 CERCLA’s significance is all the more remarkable when considering that the
statute was enacted in 1980, whereas the European Union did not enact a similar
framework until 2004.5
At the state and local levels, legislatures and agencies have developed a suite
of sophisticated instruments to deal with both hazardous substance contamination
and other complex environmental problems, such as programs that rely on voluntary
behavior by private actors to achieve a particular policy goal.6 One of the federal
predecessors of these state initiatives is the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA) Voluntary Protection Program, which removed certain
facilities from the agency’s routine inspection list as long as the sites’ operators
implemented a health and safety management system, agreed to improve workplace
safety, and passed an initial inspection.7
State voluntary programs typically follow the same core principle adopted by
the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program: if the agency provides the right
incentives, the private sector will adopt behaviors that are beneficial to the public.8
Voluntary Cleanup Programs (“VCPs”), the quintessential environmental state
voluntary initiative, address the two main hurdles that real estate developers who
wish to purchase a site that may be contaminated face. First, taking title to the
property can often make the buyer automatically liable for the contamination.9
Second, cleanup costs can be very high—easily in the hundreds of thousands or
millions of dollars—and also relatively complicated to estimate with precision
3

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018)).
4
Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United
States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 85 (2001); Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law
of Liable Party CERCLA Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191, 194 (2018).
5
See Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April
2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of
Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56.
6
See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing voluntary cleanup programs at a state and local
level).
7
See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons
from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 15 (2014).
8
See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing how voluntary state programs typically follow the
OSHA principle).
9
See infra Section II.A (discussing this type of liability and cases where the purchaser
did not contribute to contamination at the site or migration of contaminants to other
properties).
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before the remediation starts, which typically happens after the developer has
already acquired the property.10 As a prominent scholar put it, this framework
“makes it an act of heroism to purchase a [contaminated] site.”11 VCPs typically
seek to incentivize prospective buyers of contaminated properties to purchase them,
clean them up, and put them to use. To such end, these programs provide liability
protections to those who agree to remediate the site under the supervision of the state
environmental agency, and they also offer financial assistance for the cleanup,
generally in the form of grants or tax incentives.12 The state, on the other hand,
“receives the increased tax revenue from the redevelopment [and] improved
environmental quality for its citizens, and conserves state enforcement resources.”13
The way this process operates in practice is: the developer buys the land, applies to
enroll the site in the program, and, if the application is successful, the state will
oversee the cleanup until it is complete.14
Despite the proliferation of complex regulatory tools such as voluntary
programs, there still remains a lot of work to be done. According to recent estimates,
there are in excess of half a million contaminated sites in the United States,15
covering approximately 23 million acres of land—an area comparable to that of the
State of Indiana.16 To address these issues effectively, however, legislators and
agencies need more specific answers to two critical questions that the literature has
largely ignored: (i) How can we improve voluntary programs?; and (ii) What is the
appropriate level of government to implement them?
To answer the first question, agencies must first evaluate their programs to
identify potential areas of improvement. The practical problem that program
assessment poses in the context of voluntary programs, however, is that evaluating
these particularly complex government initiatives has proved very challenging.17
10

See infra Section II.B (addressing the significant barriers to brownfield
redevelopment).
11
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 296 (1997).
12
See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing state and local cleanup programs and their use of
financial assistance through tax incentives).
13
See Matthew D. Fortney, Comment, Devolving Control over Mildly Contaminated
Property: The Local Cleanup Program, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 1863, 1873 (2006).
14
See, e.g., Section IV. A (discussing New York City’s voluntary cleanup program).
15
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND: MAKING A
VISIBLE DIFFERENCE IN COMMUNITIES 3 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND]; see also Robert A. Simmons, How Many Urban
Brownfields Are Out There? An Economic Base Contraction Analysis of 31 U.S. Cities, 2
PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 267, 273 (1998) (estimating, many years earlier, that the
number of brownfields in the United States ranged from 500,000 to 600,000, or more).
16
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note
15, at 3.
17
See Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve
Environmental Quality, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 157, 160 (2002) (highlighting how
lack of baselines can complicate these assessments); Jonathan C. Borck & Cary Coglianese,
Voluntary Environmental Programs: Assessing Their Effectiveness, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T
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VCPs, for example, often have a wide variety of goals, but the available data on their
operation are typically insufficient to assess their overall success.18
The Article’s central claim is that, as a result, scholars have tried to reach
conclusions on VCPs’ overall performance by focusing not on the programs’ core
objectives, but instead on subsidiary goals that are easier to evaluate.19 Without an
adequate answer to the question of how to evaluate and improve these programs, it
is extremely difficult to determine which level of government, or combination
thereof, is in the best position to address the soil contamination problem. This
uncertainty may help explain why debates about federalism in the environmental
law literature have thus far been mostly theoretical.20
This Article addresses these shortcomings in the literature by examining a realworld example of a VCP: New York City’s Voluntary Cleanup Program (“NYC
VCP”). VCPs provide for interesting case studies because, although they are
complex and sophisticated, they remain untested in a meaningful way. The NYC
VCP was chosen for this analysis for different reasons. It is of recent adoption,
widely used, and operates in a geographic area where data on soil contamination is
plentiful. This made it possible to evaluate whether the program was meeting its
central goal, that is, spurring the redevelopment of contaminated sites.21 Moreover,

RESOURCES 305, 315 (2009) (noting that the literature evaluating the effect of voluntary
environmental programs beyond questions relating to participation is scarce).
18
See infra Sections III.A and III.B; Richard C. Hula & Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo,
Cleaning Up the Mess: Redevelopment of Urban Brownfields, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 276, 279
(2010) (noting that “the literature has yet to determine whether [brownfield redevelopment]
initiatives lead to improvements in brownfields over time”); see also Joel B. Eisen,
“Brownfields of Dreams?”: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and
Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 990 (noting that state voluntary cleanup statutes are
“too new for their effectiveness to be measured accurately”).
19
See infra Section III.A.
20
See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (“The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of the
geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate
governmental level for responding to the pollution.”); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative
Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959,
1034 n.47 (2007) (“[E]nvironmental protection is increasingly a local government issue.”);
Fortney, supra note 13, at 1890–96 (laying out the arguments in support of local cleanup
programs); Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate
Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 247 (2009) (“While the climate change crisis
may differ from other environmental problems in many ways, it is similar in that the best
approach to mitigate and adapt to the problem requires a comprehensive approach involving
multiple levels of government.”).
21
See LUIS INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., MAKING DIRTY LAND CLEAN: AN
ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK CITY’S VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM 3 (2018) [hereinafter
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the NYC VCP is the first and only VCP run by a local government agency, which
allows this Article to shed some light on the role that local governments can play in
this domain.22
The analysis in this Article yields four contributions to the literature. First, it
provides a deeper understanding of how data can and should affect the design of
voluntary environmental programs.23 Of course, in the context of VCPs, knowing
more about the location of environmental hazards from these additional data can
definitely help citizens reduce their exposure to dangerous pollutants. Less
obviously, having more comprehensive and accurate environmental data has the
additional benefit of allowing for more thorough assessments of the performance of
government programs.24 Improved assessments, in turn, make it easier for agencies
to modify their programs and make them more effective.
Second, the study of the first local VCP offers important lessons on how to best
structure collaboration between the various levels of government that participate in
the implementation of voluntary programs. Specifically, this analysis provides direct
support for a common argument raised in the federalism literature: that the need to
tailor programs to local conditions justifies a strong local government role.25 With
VCPs, state legislation can create a local regulatory gap that affects specific
municipalities; for instance, by making sites located in a particular city ineligible to
join a state cleanup program.26 When this occurs, it becomes crucial for state
legislatures to give municipal governments enough authority to allow them to create
local programs that address environmental cleanup issues effectively.27

INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR]; see also infra Section IV.A (analyzing New York
City’s VCP in detail).
22
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 14; see also infra Section
IV.A (explaining the basic features of New York City’s VCP).
23
See infra Section V.A; see also Emily A. Green, The Rustbelt and the Revitalization
of Detroit: A Commentary and Criticism of Michigan Brownfield Legislation, 5 J.L. SOC’Y
571, 605–14 (2004).
24
See infra Section V.A; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 168 (2005) (“The lack of data can
inhibit sound policy formation at all levels of government.”).
25
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 24, at 137 (2005) (“A more decentralized system is better
able to overcome this ‘knowledge problem,’ and ensure that regulatory measures take
account of local conditions.”); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of
Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 415 (2002) (“The diversity of
local conditions . . . suggests that centralized approaches to environmental protection are not
necessarily desirable when dealing with environmental problems.”).
26
For an example of this problem, see infra Section IV.A.
27
In the VCP context, this often requires allowing enrollees in a local program to have
the same liability protections that those in a state-level VCP would enjoy. See infra Section
V.B.
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Third, efficiency is a critical feature of voluntary programs.28 While having
government initiatives that are efficient is generally desirable, in the context of
voluntary programs it is a necessity.29 As this Article shows, perceived inefficiencies
and delays in the operation of a voluntary program can deter potential enrollees from
participating in it.30 Without enrollees, a voluntary program cannot operate.
Interviews with actors who have repeatedly used VCPs strongly suggest that the
predictability of the program and the general swiftness with which the agency
responds to requests and keeps the process moving forward can dramatically affect
the willingness of enrollees to use the program in the future.31
Lastly, injecting more complexity into the design of voluntary programs can be
counterproductive. As Professor Richard Epstein noted in his seminal book “Simple
Rules for a Complex World,” overly complicated rules can have a negative impact
on “the productive efficiency of the society they regulate.”32 Given that there is no
shortage of environmental problems, it can be tempting to try to address multiple
issues at once in the same program. VCPs are perceived as a tool that could
potentially be used to incentivize the development of solar installations on
contaminated sites and help combat climate change.33 This Article cautions against
blindly favoring this type of redevelopment at the expense of other beneficial uses,
such as housing and recreational uses. The technical literature makes it clear that
there is no obvious comparative advantage to using contaminated sites for solar
energy generation.34 Moreover, including provisions in a VCP that promote this
particular activity can upset the fragile balance of incentives that the various levels

28

Alberini & Segerson, supra note 17, at 173–74 (addressing the key role of efficiency
in the context of environmental voluntary programs); Green, supra note 23, at 605
(explaining that voluntary programs in Ohio and Michigan would benefit from specific
measures that would increase their efficiency).
29
See Alberini & Segerson, supra note 17, at 173–74; Green, supra note 23, at 596–
97; see also infra Section V.C.
30
See Tracy A. Hudak, Addressing Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment: An
Analysis of CERCLA and the Voluntary Cleanup Programs of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Michigan 23 (Apr. 19, 2002) (major paper for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional
Planning, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (on file with the Utah Law
Review); see also infra Section V.C.
31
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 1, 5.
32
EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 307.
33
See Silvio Marcacci, Solar Brightfields: Gigawatts of Clean Energy Potential on
America’s Landfills and Brownfields, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2017, 08:55 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/08/10/solar-brightfields-gigawatts-ofclean-energy-potential-on-americas-landfills-and-brownfields/#45f10b4b6f54 [https://perm
a.cc/LE5G-49ZV]; Robert B. Warren, The Benefits of Brightfields Developments for
Municipalities, WEIRFOULDS LLP NEWSLETTER (WeirFoulds LLP, Toronto, ON, Canada),
June 2016, https://www.weirfoulds.com/the-benefits-of-brightfields-developments-formunicipalities [https://perma.cc/ZB6R-DYXV].
34
See infra Section V.D.
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of government—federal, state, and local—have crafted for all the different land
uses.35
This Article’s contributions have implications for a number of different fields.
Agencies have set up voluntary programs not only to incentivize the cleanup and
redevelopment of contaminated sites but also to promote land conservation, reduce
the impacts of farming activities, and to improve the safety of workers, to name a
few.36 Moreover, the control of hazardous substance contamination is also tied to
other key environmental problems of our time, such as climate change. Climaterelated risks associated with contaminated properties are especially apparent with
sites located in flood zones, which are becoming an increasing source of concern as
these low-lying areas flood more and more frequently.37 Further, as noted above,
policymakers are currently evaluating the extent to which it is advisable to promote
the use of contaminated properties to host renewable energy installations and
ultimately reduce the generation of greenhouse gases.38
Implementing the principles outlined in this Article has become particularly
urgent. In the current political environment, it is unlikely that the federal government
will take the lead in creating new innovative and far-reaching regulatory programs
or that it will dedicate more resources to environmental enforcement.39 Therefore,
voluntary programs are a critical piece in the puzzle to provide a more viable
35

See infra Section V.D.
See, e.g., Coglianese & Nash, supra note 7, at 15 (describing OSHA’s voluntary
program to increase worker safety); Sherry A. Enzler, EPA-Minnesota AG Certainty
Program—Is It Up to the Task of Cleaning Our Waters?, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 959,
959–61 (2013) (explaining how agencies use voluntary programs to reduce agricultural
pollution); Stephanie Stern, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral
Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2006) (noting how financial
incentives—a tool designed to elicit voluntary action—are used in the land conservation
context).
37
See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELD REVITALIZATION IN
CLIMATE-VULNERABLE AREAS: COMMUNITY-BASED EXAMPLES FOR IMPROVING
ORDINANCE REGULATIONS, DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTS (2016)
(addressing the challenges of redeveloping contaminated sites in areas subject to flooding),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/bf_revitalization_climate_
vulnerable_areas_012616_508_v2_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VWL-EWWW]. These
initiatives, however, may be encouraging investment in areas where redevelopment is
undesirable given their risk of flooding. See Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams,
Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957, 1991 (2013) (noting the dangers of
incentivizing overinvestment in areas prone to flooding).
38
See, e.g., Parking Lot Solar Canopy Installation, EMPIRE RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC,
http://solarbyempire.com/why-solar/solar-options/118-parking-lot-canopies [https://perma.
cc/9DWL-N8E4] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
39
See Joel A. Mintz, It’s Official: Trump’s Policies Deter EPA Staff from Enforcing
the Law, THE HILL (Feb. 16, 2019, 03:00 PM EST), https://thehill.com/opinion/energyenvironment/430326-its-official-trumps-policies-deter-epa-staff-from-enforcing-the
[https://perma.cc/XF4Q-5F2D].
36
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alternative to mandatory regulation. Moreover, it is essential to structure
collaborations among various levels of government so that states and cities can adopt
a leading role in addressing a variety of environmental problems.40
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates the emergence of voluntary
programs within the history and evolution of environmental law. Part II examines
the different approaches to dealing with third-generation environmental problems,
such as the recalcitrant presence of contaminated sites in many communities. It then
explores how Congress amended federal legislation in 2018 to tackle some of these
issues and how state agencies have opted for the alternative approach of creating
voluntary programs. Part III identifies the practical challenges that agencies and
academics face when attempting to evaluate the success of voluntary programs and
uncovers critical gaps in the literature. Part IV proposes a new analytical framework
to determine whether voluntary programs are meeting their most important goal—
incentivizing private actors’ actions—and puts it to the test with the most
sophisticated municipal VCP in the nation. Finally, Part V lays out a set of
recommendations that policymakers can use to make voluntary programs more
effective and efficient. It also provides guidance on how to better structure
collaboration between different levels of government in a way that maximizes these
programs’ success.
I. THE GROWING COMPLEXITY AND SOPHISTICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The First and Second Generations of Environmental Law
Scholars often use the term “generations” to refer to the different historical
stages of environmental regulation.41 For example, federal statutes such as the Clean
Air Act are typically viewed as part of the first generation of environmental law,
whereas state programs adopting flexible market-oriented approaches are more
aligned with what scholars regard as the second generation.42 It is worth noting,
however, that different scholars may include the same statute or regulatory tool in a
different category, depending on the main feature they use to distinguish between
these two generations.43 In some cases, scholars will base this determination on the
level of government that is primarily tasked with implementing the statute (i.e.,
federal for first generation or state for second generation) and, in others, on the
40
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the literature
supporting a stronger role of local governments in addressing environmental problems).
41
See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570, 600, 605 (1996) (using the first- and second- generation terminology with regard to
environmental law); Lazarus, supra note 4, at 75, 77, 87 (alluding to first and second
generations of environmental laws).
42
See infra Section I.A.2.
43
See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 137, 150–51 (2019).
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specific type of instrument on which the program relies (e.g., command-and-control
regulation as first generation or market-based tools as second generation).44
1. The Pre-Generational Era
Societies have been working to address environmental problems for a very long
time. In Ancient Greece, for example, certain ordinances tried to reduce noise
pollution by requiring that roosters and tinsmiths be located outside the city limits.45
More recently, and until the 1970s, tort actions were the main avenue to address
environmental issues.46 Some have gone so far as to claim that, prior to 1970,
“environmental protection law in the United States was essentially nonexistent.”47
This is in part because there was no agency tasked with environmental protection at
the federal level at the time, but also because tort causes of action had not been
effective in dealing with a variety of environmental problems; for example, those in
which “private parties [were] incapable of paying for the full magnitude of the harm”
they caused.48
The issue of soil contamination, due to its magnitude and economic impact, was
one of the triggers of more comprehensive federal regulation. Soil polluting
activities (e.g., manufacturing, waste disposal, illegal dumping, and accidental
spills49) are ubiquitous. There are in excess of 530,000 contaminated sites in the
United States50 covering approximately 23 million acres of land—an area
44
Compare Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U.L. REV. 21, 21 (2001) (basing that distinction on the type of instrument used), with
Esty, supra note 41, at 600–12 (defining the two generations based on whether environmental
regulation was more or less centralized); see also infra Section I.A.2.
45
Luis Inaraja Vera, How Science Can Improve Regulation: Noise Control in Urban
Areas, 53 TULSA L. REV. 33, 36 (2017).
46
See, e.g., Esty, supra note 41, at 600 (discussing the difficulty in relying on tort
remedies as a pollution control strategy).
47
Lazarus, supra note 4, at 76. It is worth noting, however, that states and cities started
enacting statutes and ordinances to address certain environmental issues in their jurisdictions
long before 1970. See Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban
Environmental Renaissance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (NYU School of Law,
Public Law Research Paper No. 19-08) (manuscript at 10–18), https://ssrn.com/abstract=336
0548 [https://perma.cc/GRF2-3E43] (showing that Congress passed a series of landmark
environmental statutes in the 1970s).
48
See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 360 (1984); Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 47.
49
Report on the Environment: Contaminated Land: What Are the Trends in
Contaminated Land and Their Effects on Human Health and the Environment?, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/report-environment/contaminated-land [https://perma
.cc/94DE-Z6X7] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
50
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note 15, at
3; see also Simmons, supra note 15, at 273 (estimating, many years earlier, that the number
of brownfields in the United States ranged from 500,000 to 600,000, or more).
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comparable to that of the State of Indiana.51 Thus, it is not surprising that the failure
of the existing legal framework—mostly tort law—to adequately deal with the
effects of soil contamination became a catalyst for change.
During the Love Canal disaster in the 1970s, the inadequacy of tort-based
solutions became evident. This incident, which has been described as “one of the
most appalling environmental tragedies in American history,” showed the world
why the combination of insufficient regulation, residential uses, and unaddressed
soil contamination could lead to catastrophic results.52 William Love, an
entrepreneur who arrived in the Niagara Falls area in the 1890s, had the ambitious
idea to construct a several-mile-long navigable canal in the Niagara River to
generate power for local industry.53 After the excavation of a considerable amount
of soil, the project was halted, which left an empty 16-acre canal that Hooker
Electrochemical Company (“Hooker”) and other local industries later used to
dispose of their chemical waste.54 Hooker then capped the site and sold it to the
Niagara County Board of Education.55 During the next few years, a school and
approximately one hundred residences were built in the surrounding area.56
While the presence of homes in an area adjacent to an uncontrolled chemical
waste dumpsite was enough cause for concern, certain developments made this
situation even worse. In the 1970s, heavy rainfall increased the groundwater level
and mobilized the hazardous substances located in the canal, which, in some cases,
ended up in the basements of nearby residences in the form of “oily sludge.”57 Many
residents became exposed to hazardous chemicals in the sludge and experienced a
myriad of health problems, including miscarriages, birth defects, and cancer.58 To
address the public health crisis, the State of New York bought 734 residences and,
along with the federal government, spent more than $250 million on relocation and
cleanup.59 Love Canal made clear that a more effective approach was needed to
address untreated hazardous waste dumps and other environmental problems.
51
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note
15, at 3.
52
Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, 5 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY J. 17, 17 (1979).
53
Theodore Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11
ENVTL. L. 133, 135 (1980).
54
See Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our
Hazardous Wastes, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 899, 923–24 (1988) (citing ADELINE GORDON LEVINE,
LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 9–12 (1982)).
55
LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES 21 (1998).
56
Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory Legacy
of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 473 (2007).
57
Lori A. Kosakowski, The Inclusion of Passive Migration Under CERCLA Liability:
When Is Disposal Truly Disposal, 37 VAL. U.L. REV. 293, 296 (2002).
58
DAN FAGIN, TOMS RIVER: A STORY OF SCIENCE AND SALVATION 129 (2013).
59
Lynn E. Richter, AM International v. International Forging Equipment: Does
CERCLA Allow Private Parties to Contractually Allocate Liability for Cleaning Up
Contaminated Sites, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 1065, 1069–70 (1991).
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2. The First Generation of Environmental Law
Starting in the early 1970s, the legal landscape changed dramatically with the
enactment of a variety of federal statutes aimed at protecting the environment and
human health, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act,
the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act.60 This “first generation” of
environmental law had two distinctive features. First, it relied on so-called
command-and-control regulation,61 which imposes both the goals that the regulated
parties must achieve—e.g., ensuring that the emissions of a particular pollutant stay
below the specified standard—and the means they must employ to attain them—
e.g., using a particular technology.62 Second, first-generation environmental statutes
adopted a centralized approach; that is, they assigned a prominent role to the federal
government in setting the different regulatory standards.63 Scholars have provided
multiple justifications for federally oriented environmental regulation, including the
desirability of taking advantage of national economies of scale and the need to avoid
the effect of “spillover impacts of decisions in one jurisdiction on well-being in other
jurisdictions.”64
Returning to the soil contamination example, the Love Canal catastrophe and
similar incidents led Congress in 1980 to enact what one of the nation’s leading
environmental law scholars calls “the most far reaching of all the environmental
statutes”: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”).65 Interestingly, whether this statute is part of the first or

60

Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370m-12 (2018)); Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q); Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388); Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544); see also Lazarus, supra note 4, at 77–78.
61
Incentive-based regulation, on the other hand, is often tied to a “second generation”
of environmental law. See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, Environmental Law, Episode IV: A
New Hope? Can Environmental Law Adapt for Resilient Communities and Ecosystems?, 21
J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 1, 8 (2015).
62
See Daniel H. Cole, Explaining the Persistence of “Command-and-Control” in US
Environmental Law, in POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Kenneth R.
Richards & Josephine van Zeben eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2–3),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024177 [https://perma.cc/UVT9-SZLY].
63
See Esty, supra note 41, at 601–02; Stewart, supra note 44, at 21.
64
See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1211, 1215 (1977).
65
The other examples mentioned by Congress were “the Valley of the Drums,
Occidental Chemical Company’s pesticide formulation site in Lathrop, California, and the
Chemical Control site in Elizabeth, New Jersey.” Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law
Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 189
(1996). Congress’s concern about the Love Canal incident is apparent in the Act itself, which
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second generation of environmental law is a disputed question. Professor Richard
Lazarus considers it part of a second wave of environmental regulation because,
unlike the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act, which target pollution on a particular
medium (i.e., air and water), statutes such as CERCLA focus, instead, on specific
types of pollutants (i.e., hazardous substances).66 Professors Richard Stewart and
Daniel Esty, on the other hand, consider CERCLA to be a first generation statute
because it adopts a centralized approach to regulation by giving broad power to the
federal government as opposed to reserving it for the states, which, according to
their framework, is a distinctive feature of second generation statutes.67
The dispute over its generational classification aside, CERCLA’s far-reaching
reputation is owed in part to its adoption of a broad liability framework that does not
incorporate a causation requirement.68 Section 107 of CERCLA and its
implementing regulations promote this expansive approach to liability by adopting
a broad and all-encompassing definition of “potentially responsible party.”69 Those
who owned or operated an activity on a property at the time when hazardous
substances were released may, not surprisingly, be deemed liable for the release.70
However, Section 107 includes a variety of additional potentially responsible
parties.71 The most relevant, for the purposes of the discussion in this Section, are
current owners of the property, even if they acquired the property after the
contamination was already in place and did not contribute to its release or spread in
any way.72
The absence of a causation requirement for potentially responsible parties was
confirmed in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,73 where the U.S. Court of Appeals for
contains a provision specifically devoted to the “Love Canal property acquisition.” See 42
U.S.C. § 9661 (2018).
66
Lazarus, supra note 4, at 83.
67
Esty, supra note 41, at 602; Stewart, supra note 44, at 21–23, 23 n.2.
68
Amy Luria, CERCLA Contribution: An Inquiry into What Constitutes an
Administrative Settlement, 84 N.D. L. REV. 333, 333–34 (2008).
69
40 C.F.R. § 304.12(m) (2018); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
70
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2); see 40 C.F.R. § 304.12(m) (potentially responsible parties
include “any person who may be liable pursuant to section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)”).
71
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). These provisions are typically broader and, in addition to current
owners and operators, also include “(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances . . . and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person.” Id. (emphasis added).
72
Unless the current owner can claim one of the statutory defenses, such as the innocent
landowner defense recognized in Sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35). See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3).
73
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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the Second Circuit pointed out that the statute does not require a plaintiff to prove
that the defendant caused the contamination.74 Shore Realty Corp. (“Shore”)
purchased a 3.2-acre site heavily contaminated with hazardous substances, intending
to use it as a condominium development.75 The State of New York incurred a series
of costs in connection with the cleanup of the contaminated property and then sought
to recover them from Shore, the current owner, under Section 107 of CERCLA.76
Shore argued that it was not liable because it did not own the site at the time when
the release of hazardous substances occurred. 77 The court disagreed and held that
CERCLA “unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility
from which there [was] a release or threat of release [of hazardous substances],
without regard to causation.”78
The Second Circuit’s interpretation that CERCLA imposes strict liability,
which was later partially endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court,79 gave the federal
government, states, and private parties a very powerful tool to overcome some of
the existing obstacles to recovering cleanup costs.80 The first obstacle that agencies
face is determining with certainty which of the past owners of a piece of land
contributed to its contamination, which can be challenging. To make matters worse,
some of these entities may no longer exist or may be insolvent. The statute addresses
these issues by allowing plaintiffs to require the current owner to pay these cleanup
costs.81
3. The Decentralization Era and the Environmental Federalism Debate
One of the reactions to the federal environmental regulation model adopted in
the 1970s and 1980s was a subsequent movement towards a more decentralized,
second-generation approach, in which states could play a more prominent role.82
Advocates of this position responded to the concerns that had initially justified the
centralized approach of the first generation. One of these justifications was based on
74

Id. at 1044–45.
Id. at 1038.
76
Id. at 1032–43.
77
Id. at 1043.
78
Id. at 1044 (emphasis added).
79
See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 712
(1995) (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d 1032, 1044, n.17 (2d Cir. 1985) to
support the proposition that “‘traditional tort law has often imposed strict liability while
recognizing a causation defense,’ but that, in enacting [CERCLA], Congress ‘specifically
rejected including a causation requirement.’”).
80
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (2018) (listing, as potential plaintiffs, “the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe . . . [or] any other person.”).
81
Those intending to recover under this section must have incurred removal, remedial,
or response costs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (B); United States v. Atlantic Research
Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007).
82
See Esty, supra note 41, at 605.
75

810

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

the fear of a race-to-the-bottom—that is, that the lack of federal regulation would
lead smaller units of government, such as states, to adopt lax environmental
standards to attract industry and economic activity.83 Those in favor of
decentralization responded to this concern by pointing out that states also have an
incentive to compete for higher environmental quality with neighboring areas, which
would lead them to adopt stringent regulatory standards.84
Returning to the context of hazardous substances, CERCLA is a good example
of a statute that, while preserving a central role for the federal government, also
adopts a relatively decentralized approach. To achieve this goal, CERCLA contains
a provision recognizing that the liability for releases of hazardous substances under
state law is not affected by the Act.85 In addition to not displacing or preempting
state law, CERCLA expressly contemplates, and in some cases requires, an
important role for the states in implementing the statute.86 For example, Section 107
of the act authorizes states to recover costs incurred in connection with the cleanup
up of a site.87
Another reason to view CERCLA as part of the decentralization effort is that it
has led to the enactment of state-specific provisions governing liability for releases
of hazardous substances.88 These statutes generally mirror CERCLA’s liability
approach, but in some cases they have deviated from the federal standard.89 This
raises two important questions.
First, the existence of both federal and state liability frameworks can lead to
challenging scenarios in which a potentially liable party could be held liable for
83

See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 605–06 (2001) (explaining the basis for this argument).
84
See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race
to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1233–44 (1992).
85
42 U.S.C. § 9652(d). This savings clause, however, is limited by Section 309, relating
to the statute of limitations of claims under state law. See id. § 9658; Robin Kundis Craig,
Federalism Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 SW. L. REV. 617, 631 (2012).
Moreover, there are situations in which courts have found CERCLA to preempt state law
claims. See Kristi Weiner, Does CERCLA Preempt New York State Law Claims for Cost
Recovery and Contribution?, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 811, 825–26 (2010); see also PMC,
Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 1998) (“CERCLA’s savings clause
must not be used to gut provisions of CERCLA.”).
86
Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State “Little Superfunds” in Allocation and
Indemnity Actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 89 (1994).
87
The statute also recognizes this right to other parties, such as the federal government
and private citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (referring to the costs of a removal or
remedial action incurred by a State).
88
See ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE
STUDY, 2001 UPDATE 13 (2001). New Jersey’s Spill Compensation and Control Act,
however, preceded CERCLA. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 58:10-23.11 (1976).
89
See, e.g., infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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certain cleanup costs under state law but not federal law. This can happen, for
example, when the applicable state statute does not contemplate a defense to liability
that CERCLA recognizes.90 In these cases, the state agency or another party may be
able to recover its cleanup costs even if the potentially liable party would be
protected from cost recovery or contribution suits brought under federal law
(because, as pointed out above, CERCLA does not preempt state law).91 Part II
explains how most states have tempered this result by creating voluntary cleanup
programs.
Second, the role that local-level cleanup initiatives can play in this context is
largely unassessed. The literature has pointed to several reasons that, in theory,
support increasing the involvement of local governments in cleanup projects. These
reasons include the need to consider local factors when designing policies to address
land contamination problems, to have administrative action that originates closer to
the people, and to experiment with different models in order to determine which
ones are the most effective.92 The question of whether local programs are desirable,
however, can only be definitively answered once policymakers have adequate
assessments of the performance of cleanup programs. Part III of this article examines
the obstacles that agencies and scholars face when evaluating the success of these
types of programs.
B. Third-Generation Environmental Issues: The Brownfield Problem
Some environmental challenges are particularly hard to tackle. Scholars have
used the terms “third generation” and “next generation” problems to describe
environmental issues that require a more sophisticated approach than those provided
by first- and second-generation regulatory tools.93 These types of problems are often
90

New York State, for example, does not provide an equivalent to the federal bona fide
prospective purchaser protection. See Developments in Historic Contamination Liability and
Cleanup Schemes in the United States, ENVTL. PRAC. BRIEFING (Shearman & Sterling LLP,
New York, N.Y.), Winter 2004, at 3–4, https://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/NewsIn
sights/Publications/2004/12/Environmental-Practice-Briefing--Developments-in__/Files/
Download-PDF-Environmental-Practice-Briefing--De__/FileAttachment/Env_0404.pdf?la
=en&hash=D5447761577481AE9C19D5FE7588EED5615E935B [https://perma.cc/EVC59GBM]. Some courts, however, have found some of these claims to be preempted. See
Weiner, supra note 85, at 825–26.
91
See supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining the basic features of costrecovery actions under Section 107 of CERCLA). Contribution actions are governed by 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f).
92
See Fortney, supra note 13, at 1892–95; James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform
Standards in a Federal System—and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (1995);
Butler & Macey, supra note 20, at 53.
93
See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 4, at 91 (noting how scholars have pointed to the
necessity of a third generation of environmental law to deal with the environmental problems
of the next millennium); Stewart, supra note 44, at 21 (pointing out that certain
environmental challenges require a third-generation strategy).
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caused by many actors and sources; present ecological, economic, and distributional
components; and involve contaminants whose cumulative effects are not easy to
predict in space or time.94 It is important to keep in mind that, in addition to the
inherent complexity of third and next generation issues, the regulatory framework
designed to address them can also make matters worse. This Section illustrates these
challenges by focusing on a category of contaminated sites with which regulators
are still contending: brownfields.
1. What Are Brownfields?
Brownfields are properties where “the presence or potential presence” of
contamination may hinder their “expansion, redevelopment, or reuse.”95 While there
are other similar definitions of brownfield, the unifying theme is that the likely
presence of contamination may be impeding the redevelopment of the site.96
To fully understand the nature of the problem, which the next section addresses
in more detail, it is important to highlight several features of the definition of
brownfield used in this Article. First, brownfields need not be vacant.97 Sites whose
reuse may be complicated by the potential presence of hazardous substances are also
brownfields. Stated differently, part of the problem with these properties is that their
contamination may lock the land into continuing the particular use to which they are
currently being put—typically, industrial uses.98 This is so because switching to a
different use with a more stringent cleanup standard, such as residential or
commercial, can entail high remediation costs.99 Moreover, the change in use could
94

Lazarus, supra note 4, at 92; Stewart, supra note 44, at 153; J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State:
A Guide for the Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 75, 78–79 (2010) (explaining that the
existence of multiple sources and of cumulative effects that are not “proportional over time
and . . . space” are features of “massive” environmental problems).
95
42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (defining “brownfield site” as “real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence
of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant”).
96
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency defines brownfield as
“abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination.” United
States Environmental Protection Agency Grants and Fellowship Information, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/grants/united-states-environmental-protectionagency-grants-and-fellowship-information [https://perma.cc/MHZ3-XCSP] (last visited Jan.
12, 2020).
97
However, many brownfields are, in practice, vacant. Lincoln L. Davies, Note,
Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in
Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 292 (1999).
98
The term “vacant” is sometimes used to refer to unused land, with or without
buildings, and also to land with no structures.
99
Different uses often have different cleanup standards. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS., tit. 6 § 375-6.8(b) (2019) (requiring different contaminant levels for residential,
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trigger the involvement of government agencies,100 which landowners often hope to
avoid given that it may increase their risk of being the recipients of an enforcement
action.
Second, brownfields typically have mild to moderate levels of
contamination.101 Thus, they do not include properties that are heavily polluted, such
as Love Canal. While drawing the line that separates brownfields from other more
contaminated sites can be complicated, it is safe to say that sites on the National
Priorities List (“NPL”), for example, are not brownfields.102 This list includes sites
that the EPA views as presenting the highest “risk or danger to public health or
welfare or the environment.”103
The distinction between brownfields and other contaminated sites has profound
implications. A property’s level of contamination affects the type of incentives its
owner or developer may be able to receive. For example, government assistance
programs designed to incentivize the redevelopment of brownfields typically
exclude highly contaminated sites.104 Moreover, a site’s contamination levels
influence both which agencies—federal or state—may initiate an enforcement
action and their likelihood of doing so. EPA, for instance, brings enforcement

restricted-residential, commercial, and industrial uses). Moreover, a change of use may also
involve a transfer to a different operator. This may trigger reporting or remediation
obligations under some state statutes. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
100
This results from the fact that the change in use will often entail physical
modifications that require building construction or alteration permits.
101
William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4 n.1 (1997); James A. Kushner,
Brownfield Redevelopment Strategies in the United States, 22 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 857, 857
n.1 (2006).
102
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(B)(ii) (2018) (excluding NPL sites from the definition of
brownfield); see also Larry Schnapf, Special Report: State-by-State Survey of Brownfield
and Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 28 ENV’T REP. 2488, 2488 (1998) (explaining that
brownfields generally do not present levels of contamination high enough to be included in
the NPL or state equivalents).
103
42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (providing that NPL designation is based on a variety of
factors, including “the population at risk, the hazard potential of the hazardous substances at
such facilities, the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies, the potential for
direct human contact, the potential for destruction of sensitive ecosystems, the damage to
natural resources which may affect the human food chain and which is associated with any
release or threatened release, the contamination or potential contamination of the ambient air
which is associated with the release or threatened release, State preparedness to assume State
costs and responsibilities, and other appropriate factors”).
104
See, e.g., 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1402(uu)(1)(A) (2020) (limiting the eligibility of sites
to join the New York City Voluntary Cleanup Program to properties with “light to moderate
levels of contamination”).
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actions in connection with brownfields with a lower frequency than it does with
respect to more contaminated sites.105
Last, it is also important to note that, although it may be surprising at first, a
brownfield may not be contaminated at all. Under Congress’s definition, the
potential presence of contamination suffices.106 As the next section explains,
uncertainty over the type and extent of the contamination is one of the factors that
deter developers from purchasing brownfield sites.107 Therefore, the mere likelihood
of contamination—determined, for example, based on the site’s current or former
industrial use—can be enough, on its own, to make the site undesirable for
redevelopment, and thus a brownfield.
2. Why Are Brownfields So Problematic?
There are multiple problems associated with having a large number of
contaminated sites across the country. For one thing, brownfields raise a variety of
health concerns: their contamination can lead to respiratory, “liver, diabetes, stroke,
COPD, [and] heart disease.”108 For another, brownfields can contribute to urban
sprawl, as developers have a tendency to avoid these types of properties—which are
often located in more central and high-density parts of towns and cities—and instead
target clean land in lower-density and more peripheral areas. 109
In light of the gravity of the brownfield problem, it is reasonable to wonder why
first- and second-generation environmental law tools have not effectively addressed
it.110 A plausible response is that, given that there are over half a million brownfields
in the United States, the process of cleaning them up will necessarily take many
decades.111 However, this is only part of the problem. Another hurdle is that, as the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United
105

See RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 755–56 (3d ed. 2015)
[hereinafter REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY] (explaining that contamination
levels in brownfields is generally insufficient to attract EPA’s attention); Fortney, supra note
13, at 1865–66 (noting that, in practice, EPA “addresses only the most contaminated sites,”
and that there are contaminated sites that, because they are not reached by state programs
either, are still “slipping through the cracks.”).
106
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
107
See infra Section I.B.2. Certain properties may be viewed as high risk due to the
possible activities that the current or former owners carried out to contaminate the soil. For
example, using the subsurface of a property to dispose of waste presents a risk that hazardous
substances will migrate. See Joseph A. Schremmer, Getting Past Possession: Subsurface
Property Disputes as Nuisances, 95 WASH. L. REV. 101, 129–30 (2020) (noting the potential
impacts associated with the injection of hazardous and non-hazardous fluid wastes).
108
Litt et al., supra note 2, at 189.
109
See Buzbee, supra note 2, at 59 (noting that avoiding brownfields leads to sprawl).
110
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note 15,
at 3; see also Simmons, supra note 15, at 273 (estimating, many years earlier, that the number
of brownfields in the United States ranged from 500,000 to 600,000, or more).
111
See Simmons, supra note 15, at 273.
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States illustrated, equitably allocating liability among the potentially responsible
parties is extremely challenging.112 Identifying the source of each contaminant can
be complex, as the hazardous substances in question may have been released into a
brownfield by different actors over multiple decades.113 Further, the commingling
and migration of contaminants can lead to cumulative effects, which further
complicate the apportionment of harms.114
To have a more complete understanding of the brownfield problem, it is
important to pay special attention to the specific obstacles that deter their
redevelopment; namely, the—sometimes uncertain—economic costs of cleaning up
the property and the potential liability associated with purchasing a brownfield.115
(a) Economic Deterrents to Redevelopment
Cleaning up a brownfield is generally expensive.116 While the cost obviously
varies depending on the specific site considered, experts have estimated remediation
costs to be typically in the $600,000 – $1,000,000 range.117 In addition, developers
are often reluctant to invest in brownfields because hidden cleanup costs may surface

112

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–19 (2009)
(delving into the difficulties of apportioning cleanup costs in a case with multiple actors and
a variety of contaminants released over an extended period of time).
113
See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 450 (2018) (introducing Burlington Northern by observing that hazardous waste
sites can include “a complex mixture of wastes from many sources”—a problem that is often
compounded “[w]hen [potentially responsible partie]s who would otherwise shoulder
significant liability are bankrupt or insolvent”).
114
Karen D. Holl & Richard B. Howarth, Paying for Restoration, 8 RESTORATION
ECOLOGY 260, 263 (2000) (explaining that “much environmental damage is caused by
cumulative effects of many small businesses or individuals”).
115
See Richard C. Hula & Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, Cleaning Up the Mess:
Redevelopment of Urban Brownfields, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 276, 277 (2010) (presenting
cleanup costs and potential exposure to liability as two significant barriers that discourage
developers from investing in brownfields); Linda McCarthy, The Brownfield Dual Land-Use
Policy Challenge: Reducing Barriers to Private Redevelopment While Connecting Reuse to
Broader Community Goals, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 287, 289 (2002) (noting that liability for
contamination is “perhaps the greatest impediment to brownfield reuse” and also listing
availability for funding, uncertain cleanup standards, and other regulatory requirements).
116
Zeenat Kotval-K, Brownfield Redevelopment: Why Public Investments Can Pay Off,
30 ECON. DEV. Q. 275, 276 (2016).
117
Evans Paull, The Environmental and Economic Impacts of Brownfields
Redevelopment 10 (NE-Midwest Inst., Working Draft for Distribution, July 2008) (citing
other studies that also put the costs of remediation within that same range),
http://www.nemw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2008-Environ-Econ-Impacts-Brown
field-Redev.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCK8-BPZ4].
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at the late stages of the redevelopment process.118 Even when the remediation and
construction are complete, the mere fact that the land was formerly a brownfield
may complicate the sale of property, as there tends to be a “general market
resistance” with respect to these types of sites.119
Moreover, financial institutions may be unwilling to provide financing for
development projects on brownfields out of concern that the contamination will be
more costly to remediate than anticipated, thereby reducing the site’s collateral
value.120 In addition, taking title to a brownfield through foreclosure could make
private lending institutions liable for cleanup costs.121 This potential exposure to
liability further exacerbates lenders’ reticence to become involved in construction
projects on contaminated sites. While this so-called “lender liability” was tempered
by the 1996 amendments to CERCLA, it has not been completely eliminated.122
(b) The Unintended Effects of Regulation: How CERCLA’s Liability
Provisions Jeopardized Brownfield Redevelopment
Paradoxically, CERCLA liability has been the other factor significantly
discouraging the redevelopment of brownfields.123 As noted earlier, this statute—
and its state equivalents—treat current owners of contaminated properties as
potentially liable parties even if they demonstrably did not contribute to the
contamination. Because developers often purchase the sites that they intend to
118
Heather Campbell, Hugh Ellis & John Henneberry, Planning Obligations, Planning
Practice, and Land-Use Outcomes, 27 ENVT. & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 759, 770–71
(2000).
119
See Scott Sherman, Government Tax and Financial Incentives in Brownfields
Redevelopment: Inside the Developer’s Pro Forma, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 333 (2003).
120
See McCarthy, supra note 115, at 291.
121
For liability triggered by being a current owner or operator, see 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(1) (2018).
122
Section 101(20)(F)(ii) now provides that:

The term “owner or operator” does not include a person that is a lender that did
not participate in management of a vessel or facility prior to foreclosure,
notwithstanding that the person—
(I) forecloses on the vessel or facility; and
(II) after foreclosure, sells, re-leases (in the case of a lease finance transaction), or
liquidates the vessel or facility, maintains business activities, winds up operations,
undertakes a response action [. . .] if the person seeks to sell, re-lease (in the case
of a lease finance transaction), or otherwise divest the person of the vessel or
facility at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on commercially
reasonable terms, taking into account market conditions and legal and regulatory
requirements.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(ii).
123
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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redevelop,124 developers can become automatically liable for all the contamination
present on the property.125 As a result, CERCLA’s liability framework, in addition
to being a powerful tool to strengthen agencies’ authority to require the cleanup of
contaminated sites, also had the unintended effect of hindering the cleanup and
redevelopment of brownfields.126
One could question whether this effectively deters developers from targeting
these types of properties. After all, if the developer is going to purchase the site to
redevelop it, it will likely buy it at a discounted price to offset the cleanup costs.127
Once the developer owns the site, it is likely to clean up the property prior to
redeveloping it anyway, so being legally obligated to do so under this expansive
liability approach should not, in principle, change the developer’s position. This
argument, however, overlooks two important complications that result from the
often-limited knowledge of the nature and extent of the contamination. First, a
developer may find levels of contamination that exceed its predictions, to the point
of making the development project inviable economically.128 Without landowner
liability, the developer would simply be able to leave the lot vacant and, by doing
so, cut its losses. Under CERCLA and state equivalent frameworks, however, the
developer could be required to clean up the site anyway, which may dissuade the
purchase of the brownfield in the first place.129
Second, liability is not limited to the contamination present on the property that
is being acquired. Developers could also be subject to the costs of cleaning up
hazardous substances that originated at the purchased property but then migrated to
124

Daniel B. Kohlhepp, The Real Estate Development Matrix 11 (Amer. Real Estate
Soc’y Annual Meeting, Paper No. 299, 2012), https://www.ccimef.org/pdf/2012-299.TheReal-Estate-Development-Matrix.4-21-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCK8-BPZ4].
125
See supra Section I.A.2.
126
See Jessica Higgins, Evaluating the Chicago Brownfields Initiative: The Effects of
City-Initiated Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding Communities, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y. 240, 242–44 (2008).
127
See Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 277 (noting that developers tend to
purchase brownfields at a lower cost).
128
The construction of Inter Miami’s future soccer stadium in its projected location, for
example, became unclear after additional contamination was found on the property. See Joey
Flechas, Report on Beckham Stadium Site Shows Soil Contaminated by Unsafe Levels of
Arsenic, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 8, 2019, 9:43 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/community/miami-dade/article234162647.html
[https://perma.cc/4JCF-5WYY]
(While team officials initially “estimated the cleanup would cost in the range of $35 million
. . . officials have more recently estimated the cost could reach $50 million. The true number
and its feasibility won’t be known until all parties consult with DERM to develop a cleanup
plan.”).
129
The enforcement risk may actually increase as a result of the transaction, given that
some states require notice of the transfer of sites that may present a risk of contamination.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9(a) (West 2009); see also Revesz, supra note 83, at 605–
06 (explaining the disclosure obligations under New Jersey law when an industrial
establishment is transferred).
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other sites.130 For example, let us say that a developer buys Brownacre from
Landowner and, while Landowner held title to the property, there was a release of
hazardous substances that spread to a neighboring property, Greenacre. As the
current owner of Brownacre, the developer could be held liable for the
contamination of Greenacre. Thus, CERCLA-type liability can alter the developer’s
original plans by requiring it to clean up more contamination than would have been
strictly necessary to develop the site it purchased.
To try to address these and other issues, CERCLA’s 1986 amendments
incorporated a liability defense for certain owners who were justifiably unaware of
the existence of contamination at the time they purchased the site—the so-called
“innocent landowner defense.”131 This mechanism, however, has very important
limitations that make it unsuitable to effectively address liability concerns in the
context of brownfield redevelopment. Chief among these limitations is the
requirement that the buyer “did not know and had no reason to know of” the
contamination.132 As a result, the innocent landowner defense does not cover many
of today’s real estate purchasers, who often knew of the site’s potential
contamination and bought it with the intention of cleaning it up and then developing
it.133 As explained in detail in Section II.A.1, CERCLA’s 2002 amendments created
130

Section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA imposes liability, among others, on owners of the
property “from which there is a release” but does not limit the extent of that liability to the
contamination that is presently on that site. If the contamination originates at a site and later
migrates, the owner of the property where the initial release of hazardous substances took
place is responsible for the cleanup of properties contaminated by the released substances.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2018); Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1053, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding new owner liable for contamination that
previous owner caused and that migrated to other sites); Jasmine M. Starr, Making Good
Neighbors: Liability for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste Under CERCLA, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 435, 450–51 (2004) (summarizing the facts and conclusions of the court in
Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corporation).
131
Luis Inaraja Vera, Compelled Costs Under CERCLA: Incompatible Remedies, Joint
and Several Liability, and Tort Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 394, 399 (2016). This defense was
carved into the preexisting “third party” defense. See Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(f), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A)(i), 9607(b)(3)). Many states have also
adopted CERCLA’s third party and innocent landowner defenses by reference. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25323.5(b) (West 2019) (effective May 26, 1999) (“For the
purposes of this chapter, the defenses available to a responsible party or liable person shall
be those defenses specified in Sections 101(35) and 107(b) of [CERCLA].” (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(35), 9607(b))); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(d)(5) (2019).
132
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).
133
This has been the object of criticism. One author in particular has referred to this
defense as a “mirage.” L. Jager Smith, Jr., CERCLA’s Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis
or Mirage?, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 157 (1993) (pointing out that “the innocent
landowner defense provides effectively no reliable defense to a purchaser of real estate
today” (emphasis in original)).
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the “bona fide prospective purchaser” liability protection to tackle the limitations of
the 1986 innocent landowner defense.134 The 2002 liability shield, however, only
offers partial protection in states that have not incorporated an equivalent defense
into their statutes.135
*******
Part I has highlighted that, despite the increasing sophistication of
environmental law over the past few decades, certain problems resist resolution—
for example, ensuring the cleanup and productive use of contaminated sites. The
question becomes: what have regulators done to address these and other recalcitrant
environmental issues? Part II answers this question by explaining the different
mechanisms that the federal government and the states have adopted, as well as their
limitations.
II. ADDRESSING THIRD-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS:
THE EXPANSION OF VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS
The existence of third-generation problems, such as those described in Part I,
raises the question of whether third-generation solutions are an effective way of
dealing with today’s enduring environmental problems.136 This more recent wave of
regulatory tools has received a variety of names, including “new governance,”
“collaborative governance,” “responsive regulation,” and “modular environmental
regulation.”137 Two important common features of third generation approaches,
however, are that they seek to achieve environmental goals in a flexible and efficient
manner.138
While third-generation government initiatives can adopt multiple forms,
agencies have often chosen to create programs that rely on voluntary compliance by
private actors. OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Programs, for example, removed
certain facilities from its routine inspection list if they implemented a health and
safety management system, agreed to improve workplace safety, and passed an
134

See Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-118, §§ 221–222, 115 Stat. 2356, 2370–72 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(40), 9607(r) (201802)).
135
See infra Section II.A.
136
Some scholars have answered this question in the affirmative. See Orly Lobel, The
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343 (2004) (“[T]here is a growing consensus in legal
scholarship that innovative approaches to law, lawmaking, and lawyering are possible and
necessary.”).
137
See Light, supra note 43, at 153.
138
See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54
DUKE L.J. 795, 798 (2005); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The
Dangerous Journey to Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 112 (1998).
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initial inspection.139 EPA has also adopted voluntary programs, such as Performance
Track and 3/50.140
Another area in which voluntary programs have flourished is brownfield
redevelopment. While the voluntary cleanup programs have generally received less
attention from legal scholars, they are key to accelerating the cleanup of
contaminated sites. As the two following subsections show, both the federal
government and states have adopted multiple initiatives to deal with the brownfield
problem. Although both levels of government have focused on the two main issues
that hinder brownfield redevelopment—liability and economic concerns—states
have been more innovative in their approach by creating a wide variety of voluntary
programs.
A. Responses to Minimize the Unintended Effects of Regulation:
Addressing New-Owner Liability
As explained earlier, under CERCLA and other state statutes, the buyer of a
brownfield can become liable for the contamination that is present on the property
and also for pollution that has migrated to other sites.141 The practical effect of this
is that the landowner can be subject to enforcement actions from the federal
government and the state, as well as to cost recovery or contribution actions brought
by the federal government, the state, and third parties.142 As noted above, this
expansive liability framework has often discouraged developers from redeveloping
brownfields.143 To address this problem, Congress and state legislatures have created
legal protections that limit this type of liability in cases where the purchaser did not
contribute to the contamination on the site or its migration to other properties.

139

See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 7, at 15.
See id. at 12–15; Steinzor, supra note 138, at 109.
141
See supra Section I.B.2.b.
142
The main liability provision in CERCLA, Section 107(a), states that liable parties
are liable for costs incurred by the United States Government, a state, and “any other person.”
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2018). These entities can sue potentially responsible parties
to recover costs they incur to carry out a removal or remedial action. Id. § 9613(g)(2).
Lawsuits brought under this section are generally referred to as “cost-recovery” actions.
Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Private Causes of Action Under CERCLA: Navigating the Intersection
of Sections 107(a) and 113(f), 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 117, 117–20 (2015). Section
113(f) of CERCLA allows other potentially responsible parties to bring a “contribution”
action in certain cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Moreover, the statute also contains a
provision authorizing citizen suits. See id. § 9659. Lastly, Section 106 provides enforcement
authority to the federal government in cases of “imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment.” Id. § 9606(a).
143
See supra Section I.B.2.b.
140
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1. Federal Liability Protections: The Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser
CERCLA’s innocent landowner defense, which was introduced in the 1986
amendments, protected purchasers who did not know or had no reason to know that
the property they acquired was contaminated.144 This left an important gap: there
was no liability protection for innocent buyers of sites with known or even suspected
contamination.145 Developers are often in exactly this position, so EPA responded
by granting covenants-not-to-sue to purchasers of brownfields.146 These covenants
protected landowners from enforcement and court actions initiated by EPA, but they
were limited in that they did not prevent third-party claims—such as those filed by
owners of neighboring properties.147
In 2002, Congress amended CERCLA and created the bona fide prospective
purchaser protection with the goal of dealing with the liability concerns under that
the 1986 CERCLA amendments had left unaddressed.148 Since the enactment of the
2002 amendments, buyers of contaminated sites are no longer liable to the federal
government, the state, or third parties merely by becoming owners of the property,
even if they had knowledge of the contamination.149
Of course, to avail themselves of that favorable treatment, these purchasers
must meet certain conditions aimed at ensuring that the buyer (i) took the necessary
steps to learn about the existence and extent of the contamination and (ii) exercised
144

See supra Section I.B.2.b.
As some have pointed out, “this defense has been largely illusory since most courts
have ruled that if the purchaser did not discover the contamination before the transaction, it
probably did not conduct a sufficient inquiry.” See Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA
Amendments Create New Defenses and Obligations for Owners of Contaminated Properties,
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2002, at 43–44.
146
EPA tried to facilitate specific real estate transactions by providing prospective
purchasers with covenants not to sue. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON
AGREEMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3–6 (May 24,
1995),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/prosper-cont-mem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49LF-BW39].
147
Under these covenants, EPA agreed to not pursue an enforcement action. This,
however, did not affect the remedies available to third parties under federal and state law.
148
Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107118, § 222(a), 115 Stat. 2356, 2370 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)
(2018)) (requiring that “[a]ll disposal of hazardous substances at the facility occurred before
the person acquired the facility.”); see Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, LTD., 830 F.3d
975, 982 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ‘bona fide prospective purchaser defense,’ protect[s] facility
owners from liability if they can prove, inter alia, that they did not acquire the facility until
after the ‘disposal’ of hazardous substances at the facility.” (citations omitted)).
149
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1) (“[A] bona fide prospective purchaser whose potential
liability for a release or threatened release is based solely on the bona fide prospective
purchaser being considered to be an owner or operator of a facility shall not be liable as long
as the bona fide prospective purchaser does not impede the performance of a response action
or natural resource restoration.”).
145
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appropriate care to address the risk of further releases or migration of contaminants
after acquiring the property.150 In other words, the 2002 amendments’ goal was to
increase the incentives to buy, clean up, and redevelop brownfields, but without
relaxing the liability of those who caused the contamination or allowed it to worsen.
It is worth noting that, in practice, these conditions can make it very challenging
for a buyer to acquire and maintain the bona fide prospective purchaser status. In
PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, for example, it took the buyer of
the property, Ashley, a year to implement the measures that would have helped
prevent the spread of the contamination.151 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Ashley
had not taken “appropriate care,” and that, as a result, it could not invoke the bona
fide prospective purchaser protection against a claim brought by another potentially
responsible party.152
2. Tenants, Renewable Energy on Brownfields, and CERCLA’s 2018 Amendments
As explained above, it can be complicated for landowners to meet the
requirements of the bona fide prospective purchaser protection, unless they are very
diligent in addressing existing contamination. However, taking advantage of this
protection was previously even more challenging for another category of potentially
liable parties: tenants.153
Under the version of CERCLA preceding the 2018 amendments, tenants could
invoke the bona fide prospective purchaser status only if their landlord qualified for
that legal protection as well.154 Thus, if the landowner was not a bona fide

150

42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(B)(i)–(viii) (requiring, among other duties, that the purchaser
conduct appropriate inquiries with respect to the potential contamination, that it exercise
appropriate care with respect to contaminants on the site, and that it comply with any existing
institutional controls).
151
714 F.3d 161, 181 (4th Cir. 2013).
152
Id.
153
Courts have often treated tenants as either owners and operators for liability
purposes. See John Morris, What Tautology?: How the Whole Act Rule Could Inform
CERCLA’s Ownership Definition and Limit Lessees’ Liability, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 267,
271–72 (2014) (explaining that, after Bestfoods, courts have imposed so-called “lessee
liability” when certain conditions about control of the facility have been met, and pointing
out that “courts have come up with disparate answers to the question of whether. . . the rights
possessed by a lessee are sufficient to rise to the level of ownership.”).
154
The previous version of section 101(40) of CERCLA provided that “[t]he term ‘bona
fide prospective purchaser’ means a person (or tenant of a person) that acquires ownership
of a facility” and meets certain requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2012) (emphasis added).
Therefore, if the landowner is not a person who qualifies for the liability protection, a tenant
of that person will not qualify either. See David J. Freeman, Federal Budget Act Expands
Lessees’ Ability to Claim Superfund Exemption as Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers,
GIBBONS (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.rpelawalert.com/2018/04/06/federal-budget-actexpands-lessees-ability-to-claim-superfund-exemption-as-bona-fide-prospective-purchasers
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prospective purchaser, or if it later lost that status, the tenant would not be protected
from liability either.155 While this problem affected tenants of contaminated
properties broadly, EPA became concerned about this issue in the context of the
development of renewable energy projects on contaminated sites.156 To address this
gap, EPA issued a guidance document in 2012 indicating that it would use its
enforcement discretion to “treat the tenant” as a bona fide prospective purchaser in
instances where this protection would not have been available under the statute.157
However, unlike a full legislative exemption from liability, the 2012 EPA guidance
document did not protect the tenant from cost recovery or contribution claims
brought by third parties.158
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, which was signed into law in March of
2018, provided further liability protections for tenants of contaminated sites.159 It
modified the scope of the bona fide prospective purchaser protection under
CERCLA to unequivocally include tenants among the parties who may qualify.160
As with EPA’s 2012 guidance, one of the main drivers of the 2018 amendment was
the need to expand the use of brownfields to host renewable energy production
projects.161
Two points should be made about the 2018 amendment. First, the expanded
protection is likely to offer additional comfort to tenants of contaminated sites, given
that EPA’s 2012 guidance document did not, strictly speaking, limit their CERCLA

/#.Wvct1YWcGmR [https://perma.cc/CJD7-NTLH] (“Until now, lessees were precluded
from qualifying as a BFPP unless the property owner was also a BFPP.”).
155
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2012).
156
Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Asst. Administrator, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & Mathy Stanislaus, Asst. Administrator,
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional
Administrators, Regions I–X, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Dec. 5, 2012),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/tenants-bfpp-2012-memnote.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PSQ-HVM6].
157
See id. at 3–4.
158
For a clarification of the difference between cost recovery and contribution suits,
see supra note 142.
159
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018).
Although less relevant for the purposes of this article, the amendment has also relaxed the
standard that allows states and local governments to be exempt from liability when they
acquire contaminated sites. See id. at Division N--BUILD Act, § 2, 132 Stat. at 1052
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (2018)).
160
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)(ii)(I) (2018) (which includes, in the amended version
of this section, those “who acquire[] a leasehold interest in the facility . . . .”).
161
BUILD Act Alters CERCLA Liability Considerations and Funds Brownfield
Redevelopment, THOMPSON REUTERS: PRAC. L. REAL EST., Apr. 2, 2018, at 2–3 (“The
BUILD Act provides much needed funding for brownfield site redevelopment efforts. It also
shifts liability considerations for owners and lessees of contaminated real property, and
incentivizes further renewable energy development.”).
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liability.162 Stated differently, EPA’s 2012 recognition of the bona fide prospective
purchaser status for a tenant only offered protection against enforcement and cost
recovery actions from that federal agency. 163 The 2018 amendment, on the other
hand, also protects tenants against cost recovery and contribution actions that states
and third parties may bring under CERCLA.164
The second point to note is that the 2018 amendment only protects against
actions brought under CERCLA. As explained above, state statutes often provide an
independent basis for enforcement and recovery of cleanup costs.165 As a result,
unless states incorporate similar protections for tenants into their statutes, state
agencies will still be able to hold tenants liable for the contamination to the same
extent as before the 2018 amendment.166
3. State Liability Protections: Voluntary Cleanup Programs
A common theme explored in Section II.A of this Article is that the federal
bona fide prospective purchaser status only protects potentially responsible parties
against actions that arise out of CERCLA, but being designated a bona fide
prospective purchaser does not foreclose imposition of liability based on state
statutes. Thus, these state statutes can also have the effect of discouraging
brownfield redevelopment.167
What have states done to prevent the liability provisions in their own statutes
from compounding the brownfield problem? Most states have taken one of two
courses of action. One common approach has been to create the equivalent of
CERCLA’s bona fide prospective purchaser liability protection at the state level.168
Many states and at least one city, however, have chosen instead to create voluntary

162
As the document itself recognizes, the guidance merely “assist[ed] EPA personnel
in exercising the Agency’s enforcement discretion [but did not] limit [] obligations under
any federal, state, tribal, or local law.” Giles & Stanislaus, supra note 156, at 2.
163
See id.
164
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)(ii)(I).
165
See Mark McIntyre, How PlaNYC Will Facilitate Brownfield Redevelopment, 54
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 431, 435 n.17 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he [New York] Department
of Environmental Conservation has broad authority to pursue parties that conduct inadequate
cleanups.”).
166
For an explanation of why CERCLA liability protections and defenses do not
automatically limit state enforcement power, see supra Section I.A.3.
167
See Pamela K. Elkow & Emilee Mooney Scott, It’s More Than Just AAI –
“Continuing Obligations” and Other Ways to Limit Purchaser Liability, AM. BAR ASS’N 5
(Oct. 22, 2014), https://studylib.net/doc/18665964/“continuing-obligations”-and-otherways-to-limit-purchaser [https://perma.cc/Q994-U85W].
168
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.1-415(2) (West 2019).
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cleanup programs (“VCPs”).169 VCPs, also known as “brownfields programs,”170
aim to incentivize real estate developers to target brownfields, as these actors can be
a driving force in cleaning up and putting these types of properties to productive
use.171
VCPs incorporate multiple features of third-generation environmental tools.
First, VCPs are voluntary and rely on agreements entered into between agencies and
owners or prospective purchasers of brownfields.172 Second, the private sector plays
a central role in this process by leading and assuming the primary financial
responsibility for the cleanup and redevelopment of the sites.173 Third, in order to
obtain the involvement of the private sector, VCPs seek to provide a flexible and
efficient avenue to perform the cleanups.174
More specifically, the bargain typically goes as follows. The agency provides
enrollees in the VCP—current owners or prospective purchasers of brownfields—
with one or multiple benefits, often in the form of economic incentives or more
robust liability protections under state law.175 In exchange for these protections,
169

See infra Section IV.A (describing New York City’s Voluntary Cleanup Program);
Michael B. Gerrard, New York State’s Brownfields Programs: More and Less than Meets the
Eye, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 18, 19–20 (1999) (providing an overview of New York’s
initial Voluntary Remedial Program).
170
As professor David Dana explains, these two terms have become practically
interchangeable. David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of
Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 86 n.2 (2005).
171
Eisen, supra note 18, at 886–87.
172
See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 7, at 12 (including voluntary programs in this
newer wave of environmental tools); Freeman & Farber, supra note 138, at 909 (noting that
agreement based decision-making is a key feature of modular environmental regulation).
173
States also generally require developers to clean up the property that they purchased.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(a)(2) (2019) (requiring that “the brownfields
property will be suitable for the uses specified in the agreement while fully protecting public
health and the environment”); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-15-4-.02(1)(d) (effective 2004)
(“The limitation of liability provided by Code of Alabama 1975, §§ 22-30E-10 shall be
contingent upon the applicant’s good faith implementation of the voluntary property
assessment and/or voluntary cleanup plan as approved by the Department.”). Involvement of
the private sector is also a feature of third-generation environmental initiatives. See Lobel,
supra note 136, at 374.
174
See Mark P. McIntyre, David J. Freeman, & Jesse Hiney, City Brownfields Program
Aims to Accelerate Site Cleanup, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 22, 2010) (explaining that the New York
City Voluntary Cleanup Program offers ample eligibility for contaminated properties and
provides expedited approvals). Scholars have typically viewed flexibility and efficiency as
key features of third-generation environmental tools. See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 92 (citing
Steinzor, supra note 138, at 103).
175
While some states allow current owners to enter into VCPs or brownfields programs,
other states, such as Connecticut and Georgia, allow only a “prospective purchaser” to take
advantage of the liability protections. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(a) (2019); GA. CODE
ANN. § 12-8-203(b) (2019). Some have separate VCP and brownfield programs, one of
which applies to current property owners while the other applies to prospective purchasers.
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enrollees in the VCP must comply with a set of requirements. For example, in order
to be eligible to join certain VCPs, purchasers must not have contributed to the
contamination of the site—which could occur, for example, if a former operator of
a property decided to buy it.176 Another frequent requisite is that developers must
clean up the property that they purchased, even if during the process they discover
higher levels of contamination than initially expected.177 If the developer still has to
bear the risk of dealing with more extensive contamination than anticipated, what is,
then, the utility of these liability protections? The answer is that, even if the
developer must remediate the newly found contamination, liability relief provisions
can still be very valuable because they will typically exempt VCP enrollees from
off-site contamination (meaning hazardous substances that were released on the
purchased property and subsequently migrated to other sites).178
B. Addressing the Economic Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment
Economic incentives try to address the other significant barrier to brownfield
redevelopment: the additional costs associated with assessing and cleaning up the
contamination, which can create a financing gap for developers.179 There are many
economic incentives that have been adopted, the most common being low-interest
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 9107 (2019) (covering VCPs in Delaware); id. §§ 9121–9126
(covering brownfields). When analyzing liability protections, it is important to distinguish
between the full liability protection that some states offer—which also has the effect of
precluding legal actions by third parties—and the practice of providing covenants not to
sue—which often limit enforcement by state agencies but not by third parties. Compare
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(i)(1) (2019) (“An applicant whose application has been
accepted into the brownfield remediation and revitalization program shall not be liable to the
state or any person for the release of any regulated substance at or from the eligible
property.” (emphasis added)), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(a)(6) (2019) (requiring
the fulfilment of additional conditions in order for the liability protection to prevent thirdparty contribution claims).
176
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(i) (2019) (limiting liability protection if the
person enrolled in the program contributed to the contamination); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
147-F:4.I.(b) (2019) (including not having contributed to the contamination as an eligibility
criteria to enroll in the program).
177
See supra note 173.
178
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(i) (2019) (exempting the participant in the
program from liability “for the release of any regulated substance at or from the eligible
property” (emphasis added)); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.1 (LexisNexis 2019)
(protecting those who have received a certificate of completion from liability “arising out of
the presence of any contamination in, on or emanating from the brownfield site that was the
subject of such certificate.” (emphasis added)).
179
Julianne Kurdila & Elise Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield
Redevelopment, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 480, 480 n.5 (2007) (citing CHARLES
BARTSCH & BARBARA WELLS, NE-MIDWEST INST., FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR
BROWNFIELD CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT 1, 7 (2003)).
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loans, grants, and tax benefits.180 When a state provides financial assistance, it
typically does so in the context of a Voluntary Cleanup Program. The recipients of
these economic incentives can also vary widely. The federal government generally
awards grants and loans to states and municipalities, whereas states often offer
economic assistance directly to developers.181
1. Overview of Federal Economic Incentives
The federal government has regularly provided loans, grants, and tax benefits
for brownfield redevelopment. For example, the Brownfields Expensing Tax
Incentive, also referred to as the Section 198 cleanup deduction, allowed taxpayers
to deduct the cost of cleanup expenses.182 The success of this tax incentive—which
was created in 1997 and discontinued on December 31, 2011—has been called into
question. As EPA stated in a 2011 report, the cleanup deduction was not frequently
used.183 The report pointed to two main issues to explain the low popularity of the
incentive: (i) the uncertainty over its availability (it lapsed five times and was then
reauthorized for short periods of time);184 and (ii) the fact that it could be recaptured
in some instances.185 Others have asserted that developers actually used the cleanup
deduction more often than generally assumed, based on the high number of
projects—630 in total—that were certified for the deduction across the United
States.186
Another brownfield redevelopment incentive program is the Small Business
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, signed into law in 2002, which
introduced a variety of federal incentives for brownfield redevelopment

180

Sherman, supra note 119, at 338–39.
See infra Section IV.C.3.a.
182
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL TAX INCENTIVES FOR
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 2–3 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20
14-08/documents/tax_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/95LN-8P7Y] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVES GUIDE].
183
Id. at 3.
184
See id. In late April of 2018, a new bill was introduced in the House—H.R. 5579,
the Brownfields Redevelopment Tax Incentive Reauthorization Act of 2018—which would
reauthorize this expired tax incentive for the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields. This
bill, however, is in its early stages and may experience significant changes throughout the
legislative process. See Steve Dwyer, Congress Tax Relief Proposal Good Harbinger for
NYC Brownfields?, N.Y.C. BROWNFIELD PARTNERSHIP (June 12, 2018), https://nycbrownfie
ldpartnership.org/nycbp-industry-news/7842611 [https://perma.cc/HQD6-XDQY].
185
See id. Recapture occurs when “an entity is required to add back a deduction or
credit from a previous year to income.” Julia Kagan, Recapture, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 3,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/recapture.asp [https://perma.cc/V966-VTJS].
186
REDEVELOPMENT ECON., THE FEDERAL BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE: CASE
STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 2 (2015) (explaining that states “certified a total of 630
sites in the 14-year history of the program.”).
181
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administered by EPA.187 These include assessment grants, cleanup grants, job
training grants, the revolving loan fund, and the Brownfields Area-Wide Planning
program.188 The direct recipients of these incentives, however, are mostly state,
local, tribal governments, and certain “quasi-governmental authorities,” rather than
developers.189 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has also
provided incentives specifically directed at brownfields, such as the Brownfields
Economic Development Initiative awards.190 No funds, however, have been
appropriated for this latter program since 2010.191 In addition to brownfield-specific
incentives, there are other sources of funding—e.g., tax credits for real estate
projects more broadly—that could potentially be used for redevelopment projects
located on brownfields.192
2. Recent Changes in Federal Funding for Brownfield Cleanup and
Redevelopment
The two most significant changes in federal funding for brownfield
redevelopment are found in the Consolidated Omnibus Appropriations Act of

187
See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9604, 9605,
9607, 9622, 9628).
188
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY’S BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM: SCOPE, AUTHORITIES, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 3–4 (2008); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(k), 9628(a) (2018).
189
Id. at 3.
190
Brownfields Economic Development Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.
EXCH., https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/bedi/ [https://perma.cc/3M4J-MMTQ]
(last visited Nov. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Brownfields Economic Development Initiative].
191
See id.
192
For example, the historic rehabilitation tax credit and the low-income housing tax
credit could be used to redevelop certain brownfield sites. See Charlie Bartsch, New Tax Law
in Place – What Impacts on Brownfield Financing?, BROWNFIELD LISTINGS (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://brownfieldlistings.com/blog/post/guest-post-bartsch-on-final-tax-bill-impact-tobrownfield-financing [https://perma.cc/X4UN-E55K].
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2018,193 also referred to as the “Omnibus Act,”194 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017,195 commonly known as the Trump Administration’s “New Tax Law.”196
The main goal of the provisions of the Omnibus Act of 2018 pertaining to
brownfields is to inject flexibility into the existing grant programs. For example,
under the Omnibus Act, sites that are only contaminated with petroleum are now
eligible for certain types of funding even if they do not meet the conditions that the
previous version of the statute required, including now allowing funding for sites
that present more than a “low risk.”197 The Act also now allows grants that cover
characterization, assessment, and remediation, whereas the previous statute required
that separate grants be awarded for characterization/assessment and remediation.198
In addition to greater flexibility, the amendments also increased the maximum
amounts of remediation grants from $200,000 to $500,000, with the possibility of
reaching $650,000 with EPA’s approval.199 It is important to note, however, that the
total authorization for appropriations will remain at the same level as in the previous
version of the statute, i.e., $200,000.200
The New Tax Law was signed into law on December 22, 2017.201 One of the
main innovations was the creation of tax benefits for projects in opportunity zones.
While this incentive is not specific to brownfields, many of the opportunity zones—
low-income census tracts that are designated in accordance with the statutory

193

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018).
Michael J. Quinn, United States: The BUILD Act: Revisions to Environmental Due
Diligence and Brownfields Affect Who Is Liable and How, MONDAQ (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/Environment/738120/The-BUILD-Act-RevisionsTo-Environmental-Due-Diligence-And-Brownfields-Affect-Who-Is-Liable-And-How
[https://perma.cc/K7HM-6YDS].
195
Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
196
See, e.g., Darla Mercado, Trump Wants to Extend His Tax Overhaul. What It Means
for You, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2020, 4;09 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/10/trump-wantsto-extend-his-tax-overhaul-what-it-means-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/CZT9-MHMN].
197
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA) (2002) (requiring that petroleumonly sites be “relatively low risk”), with 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(II)(bb) (2018) (no
longer including such a requirement).
198
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Division N—BUILD Act § 9(3), 132
Stat. at 1056 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9604(k)(4) (2018) (creating the multipurpose
brownfield grants)); David J. Freeman, Budget Act Makes Changes to Federal Brownfield
Program, GIBBONS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.rpelawalert.com/2018/04/10/budget-actmakes-changes-to-federal-brownfield-program/#.Wv8peIWcGmR [https://perma.cc/N8G6KBUT].
199
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Division N—BUILD Act § 8, 132 Stat.
at 1055.
200
See id. § 13, 132 Stat. at 1058.
201
Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
194
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procedure202—have a high concentration of contaminated sites.203 The incentives for
investors include the possibility to defer tax on prior capital gains invested in
opportunity zones and other mechanisms that could have favorable tax treatment
when the investment is sold after ten or more years.204 Moreover, the Omnibus Act
has not eliminated the existing tax incentives that could potentially be used for
brownfields, such as the historic rehabilitation tax credits, the new markets tax
credits, the low-income housing tax credits, etc.205 It is worth noting, however, that
some of these incentives may become less valuable given the general reduction in
the corporate tax rate.206
3. State-Level Economic Incentives Linked to VCPs
Federal incentives have helped redevelopment efforts in numerous
contaminated sites.207 However, federal programs can only address a very limited
number of brownfields in any given state every year. As a brownfield redevelopment
expert put it, federal funding for these types of sites has only been “a drop in the
bucket.”208
To fill the funding gap, many states have created their own economic incentives
for brownfield redevelopment, which they often provide to enrollees in their
Voluntary Cleanup Programs.209 The State of Colorado, for example, provides “a
40% tax credit on cleanup expenses up to $750,000 and a 30% credit on cleanup

202

The designation procedures include a nomination by the state and certification by
the Secretary of the Treasury. See id. § 13823, 131 Stat. at 2183 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(b)).
203
Webinar: Opportunity Zones - Spurring Brownfields Revitalization with the New
Tax Law, CTR. FOR CREATIVE LAND RECYCLING, https://www.cclr.org/civicrm/event/info?
reset=1&id=246 [https://perma.cc/W55R-VV2P] (last visited May 18, 2018) (implying the
overlap between opportunity zones and corridors of contaminated properties).
204
See Budget Fiscal Year, 2018 § 13823, 131 Stat. at 2183 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b), (c)).
205
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
206
See Bartsch, supra note 192.
207
See, e.g., REDEVELOPMENT ECON., supra note 186, at 6–7 (listing a number of
projects that benefited from the Brownfields Expensing Tax Incentive).
208
Sylvia Carignan, Trump Proposes New Funding Options for Superfund, Brownfields
(1), BLOOMBERG ENV’T, https://www.bna.com/trump-proposes-new-n57982088681/
[https://perma.cc/4LBP-FRDT] (last updated Feb. 12, 2018, 4:27 PM) (quoting Dan French,
chief executive officer of Brownfield Listings).
209
It is important to note, however, that some of these state incentives are funded
through the federal programs mentioned above. See, e.g., WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., PUB. NO.
RR-753, WISCONSIN READY FOR REUSE PROGRAM: HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LOANS &
GRANTS, https://dnr.wi.gov/files/PDF/pubs/rr/RR753.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2ST-TT2Z]
(“The D[epartment of ]N[atural ]R[esources] receives funding for this program through U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Revolving Loan Fund grants.”).
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expenses greater than $750,000 up to $1,500,000.”210 Other states, including
Massachusetts, New York, and Delaware, offer brownfield-specific tax credits to
developers.211 Wisconsin awards grants for cleanup activities of up to $200,000.212
Ohio provides “property assessment services at no cost to eligible applicants,” which
must be local governments or quasi-government entities.213 Indiana makes low-andzero interest loans available to public and private parties to cover brownfield cleanup
costs.214
*********
Part II has examined how agencies are using third-generation tools—and
Voluntary Cleanup Programs in particular—to deal with complicated environmental
issues. This raises three important questions: (i) are these tools effective?, (ii) how
can policymakers improve them?, and (iii) which level of government is in the best
position to lead these efforts? The remainder of this Article aims to advance the
conversation on these three questions.
III. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIRD-GENERATION
ENVIRONMENTAL TOOLS
As regulatory instruments become increasingly complex, so does the task of
evaluating their performance. Sophisticated government programs, such as thirdgeneration voluntary tools, often have many moving parts and are intertwined with
initiatives led by other agencies.215 Nevertheless, as is true of any other government
action involving public expenditures, measuring their success is critical to ensuring
that agencies use their limited economic resources wisely.
Unfortunately, there are a number of factors that complicate this task. First,
third generation voluntary programs tend to have multiple goals—VCPs, for
example, aim to promote fast cleanups, address environmental justice issues, ensure
compliance with health standards, etc.216 Second, measuring if the agency is
210

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE
PROGRAMS 51 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/state
_brownfields_voluntary_response_program_report_508_11-2017_web.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5RE2-CSUG].
211
See id. at 7, 13, 16.
212
See WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., supra note 209.
213
Grant-Funded Brownfield Assistance, OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://epa.ohio.gov/derr/SABR/Grant_Assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc/BH6L-TQUJ] (last
visited Aug. 19, 2019).
214
Financial Assistance, IND. FIN. AUTH., https://www.in.gov/ifa/brownfields/2366.ht
m#taxincentives [https://perma.cc/Q4SW-GUBY] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
215
See infra Section IV.C.3 (analyzing the challenges of isolating the effects of a local
program when state and federal initiatives are also involved).
216
See infra Section III.A.
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successfully achieving each goal requires the use of different methodological
approaches. These two obstacles are typically connected: the literature often fails to
assess goals that, despite their importance, are more complicated to measure.217 The
next two sections delve into the practical aspects of this problem by exploring the
challenges of measuring the success of VCPs.
A. Determining an Adequate Measure of Success for VCPs
Scholars and policymakers have a variety of strategies at their disposal to assess
the performance of VCPs. For example, one could focus on the number of sites that
have enrolled in the program and conclude that a high figure is reflective of
success.218 Other options include determining the number of sites that have been
cleaned up since the inception of the program,219 average duration of the cleanup
process, or the cleanup standards reached for the sites enrolled in the VCP.220 Some
scholars have even analyzed the distributional impacts of these types of programs
and the variations in property values that they may have triggered.221
All this information can be useful. For example, given its voluntary nature, high
enrollment in a VCP may signal that participants are finding the program to be
advantageous. Moreover, quick cleanups may indicate that the program is run in an
efficient manner. However, these approaches neglect to evaluate one of the most
critical features of a VCP: whether the program is actually spurring brownfield
redevelopment.222 Stated differently, the question is whether a VCP is actually
incentivizing public and private parties to acquire, clean up, and redevelop
brownfields that would otherwise remain vacant or underused; as opposed to merely
increasing the benefit for those who, as a result of the market forces, were going to
purchase these sites anyway.
There are other ways of framing the success of VCPs that can also lead to an
overestimation of their benefits. When the parcels remediated under a VCP have
been put to commercial uses, agencies sometimes argue that the program has been
successful by pointing to job creation or private investment figures associated with

217

See infra Section III.B.
See, e.g., U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY
RESPONSE PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/docume
nts/state_brownfields_voluntary_response_program_report_508_11-2017_web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y46G-4CHV] (noting the number of sites enrolled in each state VCP).
219
See id. (including the number of remediated sites under each state VCP).
220
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 11–12.
221
See, e.g., Hunter Bacot & Cindy O’Dell, Establishing Indicators to Evaluate
Brownfield Redevelopment, 20.2 ECON. DEV. Q. 142, 154 (2006); McCarthy, supra note 115,
at 293–94.
222
See Sherman, supra note 119, at 368 (“[F]rom a policy viewpoint, the core question
is whether the incentive really would spur development at a site that otherwise would not be
feasible and thus would be ignored by the private sector.”).
218
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the activities that are carried out at the site after the cleanup is complete.223 These
types of statements contain an implied assumption about VCPs, which is that
redevelopment of brownfields would not occur but for these programs and that,
consequently, the positive effects observed can be directly attributed to the
programs.224 Interestingly, this assumption is seldom proven when government
agencies or scholars make statements about how a certain VCP created X number of
jobs or attracted Y millions of dollars in investment.225
But, is this premise accurate or even reasonable? The scholarship on this
question is extremely scarce. However, there are some basic principles that can
provide some insight as to whether the claim that a given VCP is actually
incentivizing brownfield redevelopment is justified. The following table captures
two key scenarios that can guide this type of inquiry:

Scenario A (VCP more
likely to spur development)
Scenario B (VCP’s ability
to spur development is
uncertain)

Property
Values
Low

Cleanup Cost
High

Economic
Incentive Provided
High

High

Low

Low

The premise that a significant proportion of the sites that enroll in a VCP would
not be redeveloped but for the existence of the program may be accurate in some
instances. In scenario A, for instance, the return on investment in brownfields may
be low or even negative as a result of the land value, high cleanup costs, and the
conditions of the real estate market in the area, but the economic incentives provided
by the program are high. When a scenario like this occurs, a very undesirable
property is being matched with a very generous incentive, and it is certainly likely
that the property would not have been redeveloped without the incentive.226
However, the but-for assumption does not necessarily hold true in the reverse
scenario, scenario B, when the value of the land is relatively high despite the
contamination, and the financial assistance for brownfield redevelopment is modest.
In this context, the need for the incentive is much lower, so it is not reasonable to
simply assume that the VCP is changing developers’ behavior without proof.227
223

See Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 279.
This assumption is implicit in statements suggesting that, by creating a VCP, “the
state receives the increased tax revenue from the redevelopment, improved environmental
quality for its citizens, and conserves state enforcement resources.” Fortney, supra note 13,
at 1873.
225
See Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 279.
226
See Sherman, supra note 119, at 368 (explaining that a sizeable grant has the ability
to “enhance project feasibility”).
227
As noted in the literature, even different developers can respond differently to the
same subsidy and liability protection package, injecting additional complexity to this issue.
224
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B. The Challenges of Measuring Whether a VCP Is Incentivizing Brownfield
Redevelopment
Determining if a VCP is incentivizing brownfield redevelopment is an arduous
task because agencies rarely have sufficient data to do so. As explained above, it is
relatively easy to gain access to information on the number of sites enrolled in a
VCP. High enrollment in a VCP is indicative of success in a very narrow sense.
Robust enrollment confirms that, when given the opportunity to take advantage of
this type of program, redeveloping a site under the VCP is more attractive than doing
so without government intervention. This is a significant accomplishment. VCPs
require the approval of certain documents by the supervising agency,228 which will
inevitably delay the investigation and cleanup process. The fact that a developer is
willing to take on this burden voluntarily strongly suggests that the incentives that
the program offers outweigh the delay and other inconvenience that dealing with the
agency may entail.229 From a public health standpoint, increasing the number of
supervised cleanups is also a laudable goal, as this is likely to result in greater
compliance with the applicable remediation standards and best practices.230
However, as noted above, enrollment figures alone cannot support the
conclusion that the program has been successful in spurring brownfield
redevelopment.231 Without more information, one cannot rule out other possible
explanations for high enrollment in the program. For example, the plausible
possibility that most of the observed redevelopment would have also occurred
without the VCP—which is likely to be true in areas where real estate markets are
thriving. There are, of course, intermediate options. Thus, the VCP may have
increased the redevelopment of brownfields by 20%, 50%, or any other percentage.
How, then, should we evaluate if a VCP is spurring brownfield redevelopment?
Another option could be to rely on vacancy periods—the number of years during
which a property was vacant before joining the program. If we are examining the
Anna Alberini et al., The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of Developers, 35
REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 327, 349 (2005).
228
Bacot & O’Dell, supra note 221, at 148.
229
It is important to note, however, that in some cases the option of conducting an
unsupervised cleanup may not exist, if the property has been flagged by the federal, state, or
local governments as being potentially contaminated. This could occur, for example, if a
previous owner reported a spill of hazardous substances in the past.
230
EPA Principles for Greener Cleanups, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https:/www.epa.gov/greenercleanups/epa-principles-greener-cleanups [https://perma.cc/BV
W7-LAEZ] (last updated Sept. 5, 2018).
231
Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, for example, conclude that data indicating that a program
has been widely used “is evidence that, at a minimum, the [program] has created a viable
market in [brownfields].” Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 280 (emphasis
added). However, this market could have existed before the programs were put into place.
See id.
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success of a new program, long vacancy periods followed by enrollment in the VCP
would seem to suggest that the program is triggering the redevelopment of sites that
would otherwise still be vacant. However, the vacancy period approach presents
serious limitations. First, it focuses on a particular type of brownfield: those that are
vacant. The vacancy period approach does not consider sites that, while not being
vacant, are underutilized because of the contamination. As explained above in
Section I.B.1, these properties also fall within the scope of EPA’s definition of
brownfield.232 Second, there are many reasons, other than the effect of the program,
that could explain why properties that had been vacant for several years are now
being redeveloped. For example, the real estate market could be rebounding after a
recession. This could spur the development of properties that were not attractive to
developers a few years earlier.233 A similar phenomenon could occur as a result of a
rezoning process. If a certain area is up-zoned—meaning that higher-value or denser
uses will now be permitted—sites that had been vacant for a long time could
suddenly become more appealing to developers.234 In short, as with enrollment
numbers, an analysis of vacancy periods alone does not provide enough information
to evaluate whether a VCP is incentivizing brownfield redevelopment.
An alternative strategy would be to determine whether there has been a
noticeable change in brownfield redevelopment in a particular jurisdiction since the
agency launched the program. While this methodology can lead to sound
conclusions, it presents a number of practical challenges. First, to make such a
comparison, it is necessary to have an inventory of the existing brownfields in the
jurisdiction, or a significant portion thereof. VCP enrollment data is insufficient
because it provides information on which properties are, or have been, in the
programs but does not indicate which brownfields have been redeveloped outside of
a program or the number of brownfields that were being redeveloped before the
program was created. 235 Having data on the redevelopment of brownfields before
the inception of the program is necessary to establish a baseline to determine whether
there was a significant increase in the redevelopment rates for brownfields after the
launch of a program.
Second, determining if a particular VCP is spurring brownfield redevelopment
can be challenging due to the existence of multiple layers of incentives and
regulations—federal, state, and local—that could mask or enhance the perceived

232

See supra Section I.B.1.
Joseph Nguyen, 4 Key Factors that Drive the Real Estate Market, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mortages-real-estate/11/factors-affecting-real-estatemarket.asp [https://perma.cc/4MA7-JLUY] (last updated June 25, 2019).
234
See Up-zoning, THE WORLD BANK, https://urban-regeneration.worldbank.org/node
/21 [https://perma.cc/DY7B-458T] (last visited, Aug. 19, 2019).
235
As noted in the literature, “[o]ne key difficulty in adequately evaluating brownfield
programs is the lack of capacity to track the existence and redevelopment of sites.” Hula &
Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 277. Others have also noted the difficulties of
establishing a baseline for comparison. See Alberini & Segerson, supra note 17, at 160.
233
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effects of the program that is being evaluated.236 Thus, it is important to have a clear
understanding of the most significant incentives—in addition to those offered by the
VCP that is being evaluated—that could have affected brownfield redevelopment in
a certain geographic area during a given period. Part IV takes on this challenge by
proposing a methodology to address these and other practical challenges.
IV. ASSESSING THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST LOCAL VCP
In 2010, New York City created the first municipally run brownfield cleanup
program.237 The City’s VCP has two features that make it a particularly interesting
case study. First, developers have used the program widely even though it has only
been in place for ten years. Second, and most important, this VCP is a particularly
good example of a program whose ability to drive development, if not tested, would
be uncertain. This uncertainty results from a combination of factors: the program
targets mildly contaminated sites (which tend to have lower cleanup costs), it
operates in a geographic area with high property values, and it provides relatively
low economic incentives. As explained above, this is the type of context—scenarioB-type cases—in which it is a priori unclear whether the VCP would have an impact
on the redevelopment rate of brownfields.238
A. NYC’s Voluntary Cleanup Program
The City’s decision to create a cleanup program was, in part, in response to
changes in 2005 to the administration of the New York State Brownfield Cleanup
Program (“state program”) that had the effect of making a large number of
brownfields in New York City ineligible to enroll in the state program.239 The City
programs sought to provide an alternative for these New York City sites, while also
bringing new businesses and jobs, and new affordable housing and open space.240
The primary City program is the NYC Voluntary Cleanup Program (“NYC
VCP”), which monitors the investigation, cleanup, and site management activities

236

See supra Part II (explaining the variety of state- and federal-level incentives for
brownfield redevelopment).
237
About OER, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oer/
about/directors-message.page [https://perma.cc/3Y3K-UPHN] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
238
See supra Section III.A.
239
See McIntyre et al., supra note 174.
240
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC: PROGRESS REPORT 2014, at 11 (2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_FINAL_
Web.pdf, [https://perma.cc/UE4E-ZVMJ] (tracking the increase in jobs and housing
correlated to city goals) [hereinafter PLANYC]; N.Y.C. OFFICE OF ENVTL. REMEDIATION,
N.Y.C. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oer/html/voluntarycleanup-program/vcp.shtml [https://perma.cc/YCE5-YYEX] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).
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at enrolled brownfields.241 Landowners interested in enrolling a property in the NYC
VCP may file an application to the agency administering the program. Any real
property within New York City with light to moderate levels of contamination is
eligible to enroll in the NYC VCP, with limited exceptions, such as sites enrolled in
the state cleanup program.242
The NYC VCP offers multiple incentives to its participants, including a
covenant not to sue,243 a formal recognition that properties remediated under the
program have achieved all applicable government cleanup standards in New York
State,244 and grants for investigation and cleanup.245 The grant program is an
important part of this framework. It has the stated goal of “promot[ing] the cleanup
and redevelopment of brownfield properties in the city of New York.”246 The grant
amounts, however, are rather modest. Although the maximum grant that a project
may receive varies depending on the type of project—and, in some instances, the
type of developer—the following figures are illustrative of the order of magnitude
of these economic incentives. The standard grant has two caps, the highest being
$35,000.247 The maximum amount that a project may claim—if it meets the criteria
to be considered a “city-supported development”248—was initially set at $100,000

241

Site management activities have the goal of minimizing exposure to the
contaminants that remain at the site after cleanup. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1402.eee (2020).
242
Sites with light to moderate levels of contamination include those with “detectable
levels of contamination, the presence of which does not require an applicant or enrollee to
conduct any mandatory, governmental-supervised investigation or remediation of the
contamination under any state or federal law.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 24-902 (2019). Other
exceptions include sites that contain petroleum, listed in certain state and federal registries,
or subject to enforcement actions. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1403 (2020); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 24-902 (2019).
243
See infra Section V.B.
244
See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1429(b) (2020) (defining “green property certification”).
245
See id. § 43-1415 to -1423.
246
Id. § 43-1415(a).
247
See id. § 43-1422.c.1, Schedule A. The amount can reach $50,000 if the applicant is
a not-for-profit developer or a developer of a residential building where all units are
affordable. See id. § 43-1422.c.2.
248
City-supported development properties are those:
[A]t publicly-owned sites, at affordable and/or supportive housing sites funded by
the New York city department of housing preservation and development, at
industrial or manufacturing development sites supported by the New York city
economic development corporation or other projects receiving substantial support
from the City, and at environmental tax lien sites designated by the New York
city office of management and budget.
14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1417(a), (b) (2019).
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and was raised to $250,000 in 2016.249 These amounts are an order of magnitude
lower than the average tax credit granted under the state program, which the New
York State Comptroller’s Office estimated at $9.4 million per project in 2013.250
B. Traditional Methods of Assessing VCPs: Enrollment
As discussed in Part III, knowing how many sites have enrolled in a VCP, while
not being a particularly compelling method of measuring overall success, can still
provide valuable insights on important aspects of the program. The agency running
the NYC VCP, the NYC Mayor’s Office of Environmental Remediation (“OER”),
has reported basic figures on the program. For example, based on OER’s estimates,
the developments performed under the NYC VCP have yielded over 9,000 units of
affordable and supportive housing and created more than 13,000 permanent jobs.251
Obtaining more detailed data on the sites enrolled in the NYC VCP, however,
has required the collection of thousands of technical documents. These datasets were
built based on the data available on OER’s two websites.252 The number of
applications in 2010 through 2017 was in excess of 560, and over 500 sites
ultimately enrolled in the NYC VCP.253 These figures, when compared to other state
cleanup programs, show the NYC VCP has been very broadly used. To provide some
perspective, it is illustrative to examine application and enrollment data from state
programs that share similar features with the NYC VCP.254 The New York State
program was created in 2003, and as of January of 2017, the agency administering
it had approved 713 applications since the program’s inception.255 VCPs in Illinois
249

With the caveat that, if the project is enrolled in the NYC VCP, the site is also
eligible for a $50,000 cleanup grant. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1422.c.12 (2019).
250
THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, BROWNFIELD RESTORATION IN
NEW YORK STATE: PROGRAM REVIEW AND OPTIONS 15 (April 2013), https://nysl.ptfs.com/
awweb/pdfopener?sid=A5C1E2DEE71D433813D51F1004C7B1BD&did=114817&fl=%2
FLibrary1%2Fpdf%2F852898120.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8K-M2SA].
251
PLANYC, supra note 240, at 11 (reporting 3,900 new affordable housing units and
6,400 jobs created from 2011 to 2014 as a result of the VCP program); THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, PROGRESS REPORT: ONENYC 2018, at 71 (2018), https://onenyc.cityofnewyork.us/
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/OneNYC_Progress_2018-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9X5HLEDY] (reporting an increase of 5,200 units and 7,000 jobs from 2014 to 2018 as a result of
the VCP program).
252
Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
https:/www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8442.html [https://perma.cc/HYA7-2MET] (last visited
Jan. 13, 2020).
253
INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 6.
254
The New York State, Illinois, and Ohio VCPs are similar to the NYC VCP in that
they are voluntary, they provide economic incentives, and they include assurances that those
who remediate sites under the program will either enjoy liability protections or a lower
likelihood of enforcement.
255
See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE
PROGRAMS 13 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/state
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and Ohio were launched in the 1990s but had enrolled 799 and 655, respectively, as
of January 1, 2017.256
The duration of the cleanup can also shed some light on whether a particular
program is being administered efficiently. How swiftly the process moves forward
is generally related not only to the duration of the cleanup activities but also to the
amount of time that the agency supervising the remediation takes to grant the
approval of the different documents that the developer is required to generate at the
various stages of the process. As explained in detail elsewhere, it takes an NYC VCP
enrollee approximately 21 months on average to complete the cleanup, compared to
almost 58 months under the state program.257 To make a fair comparison, however,
it is important to note that sites in the state program tend to be more contaminated
than NYC VCP sites, and therefore may require more extensive remediation.258
C. Has the NYC VCP Spurred Redevelopment?
The metrics examined above, while impressive and useful, do not address a key
question that many VCPs raise: Is the program, in addition to recruiting enough
enrollees, driving the redevelopment of contaminated sites? One of the main goals
of VCPs generally is to promote the redevelopment of brownfields that, in the
absence of these programs, would be left vacant or underused.259 As the City has
made clear on multiple occasions, the NYC VCP is no exception.260 This Section
addresses this question by examining if the redevelopment rate of brownfields in
_brownfields_voluntary_response_program_report_508_11-2017_web.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5RE2-CSUG].
256
See id. at 32, 36; Site Remediation Program Database Search, ILL. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.illinois.gov/topics/cleanup-programs/bol-database/srp/index
[https://perma.cc/ZET2-9QGQ] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
257
INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 12.
258
Id. at 11.
259
See Sherman, supra note 119, at 317 (“Recognizing the need to secure the cleanup
of historic contamination and spur the redevelopment of underutilized sites, government
policy-makers have sought to reform the regulatory framework under which brownfield
issues are addressed.”).
260
See, e.g., About: Director’s Message, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oer/about/directors-message.page
[https://perma.cc/3Y3KUPHN] (last visited, Aug. 19, 2019) (“The New York City Mayor’s Office of Environmental
Remediation (OER) is a team of scientists and engineers that design and operate programs
to promote the cleanup and redevelopment of vacant contaminated land in NYC.”); Stu
Loeser & John Gallagher, Mayor Bloomberg Presents PlaNYC:, A Greener, Greater New
York, CITY OF N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2007), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/11907/mayor-bloomberg-presents-planyc-a-greener-greater-new-york#/0 [https://perma.cc/56
39-R5ZJ] (“We propose to speed the clean-up of all 7,600 acres of brownfields still in our
city – while also ensuring public health protections by developing new time-saving
strategies, new city-specific remediation guidelines, and a new city brownfields office to
oversee the initiatives and encourage community involvement.”).
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New York City has increased since the creation of the program in 2010. This
required dealing with three major issues: distinguishing brownfields from nonbrownfields; defining an adequate measure of redevelopment rates; and minimizing
the effects of other programs so as to adequately measure the impact of the NYC
VCP on brownfield redevelopment rates.
1. Defining the Treatment and Control Groups: Which Lots Should Be Considered
Brownfields?
Brownfields are usually defined very broadly as properties that are either
contaminated or present a risk of contamination.261 While there is no official list of
brownfields in New York City, the City does maintain two lists of tax lots with
potential environmental issues. The agency adds tax lots to these lists when they
receive an E-designation or an environmental restrictive declaration (“ERD”) in the
context of the City’s environmental review process,262 which typically takes place
when one or more lots are rezoned.263 The compilation of these lists started in the
1980s, but the vast majority of E-designations and ERDs have been added after
1999.264 The purpose of the two lists is to ensure that developers address the
environmental issues in listed lots before they reuse or redevelop them. To achieve
this goal, City regulations require that OER, the agency running the NYC VCP, grant
its approval before the Department of Buildings may grant a building permit for a
lot that has an E-designation or ERD.265
There are three types of E-designations and ERDs: hazardous materials, noise,
and air quality.266 Lots with hazardous materials E-designations or ERDs are good
261

Overview of EPA’s Brownfields Program: EPA’s Brownfields and Land
Revitalization Program Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/brown
fields/overview-epas-brownfields-program [https://perma.cc/94N2-3TJC] (last visited Jan.
13, 2020).
262
These two categories have, for the most part, merged into one. See INARAJA VERA,
N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 3 n.8 (“The rules before the 2012 amendment did
not allow the city to place an E-designation on a lot if the applicant (of the rezoning) was
also the owner. In these cases, the environmental requirements were incorporated into an
environmental restrictive declaration. The 2012 amendment expanded the scope of the Edesignation provisions to include lots owned by the applicant.”).
263
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 11-15 (2012); 15 R.C.N.Y. § 24-04 (2019). In some
instances, lots may also receive an E-designation or ERD as a result of zoning actions that
do not involve a formal rezoning (e.g., special permits or variances). Id. § 24-04.b; see id. §
24-03 (defining “Zoning Action”).
264
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION app. C, tbl.1 and tbl.2.
265
See id. § 24-08(a) (notice of satisfaction). Other options are a notice of no objection
and a notice to proceed.
266
Hazardous materials E-designations currently include the former “underground
gasoline storage tank” E-designation. The term “hazardous materials” in this article will be
used to encompass both “hazardous materials” and “underground gasoline storage tank” Edesignations.
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proxies for brownfields. As reflected in the definition of brownfield discussed in
Part I, it is the potential, not actual, presence of contamination that can deter
developers from targeting these types of sites.267 Sites receiving an E-designation or
ERD for hazardous materials are precisely that: real property that the City believes
presents a reasonable risk of contamination.268 Therefore, the treatment group for
the purposes of this Article’s analysis is defined as tax lots that received hazardous
materials E-designation or ERD. For simplicity, these types of lots will be referred
to as “brownfields” or “treatment” in the remainder of Part IV.
Because the overwhelming majority of hazardous materials E-designated/ERD
sites are located in rezoned areas, 269 the analysis in this Section is limited to parts of
New York City that have been rezoned.270 Interestingly, over 80% of the sites
enrolled in the NYC VCP—which could, in theory, be anywhere in the City—are
located in areas rezoned between 2002 and 2016.271 This trend is consistent with the
theory that developers are enjoying the benefits of the program to develop properties
that they would have developed anyway. Of course, this observation cannot be
conclusively established based on the overlap alone, which is why the analysis of
redevelopment trends discussed in this Section is necessary to answer whether
developers are receiving a benefit for actions they would have taken anyway.
2. Measuring Redevelopment Rates
The estimation strategy measures variation in redevelopment rates of tax lots
in rezoned areas of New York City before and after 2010—the year in which the
City created the NYC VCP. A tax lot is deemed to undergo redevelopment on a
particular year if the Department of Buildings granted a building permit for new
construction or major alteration that year.272 For each rezoned area and year, the rate
of redevelopment is calculated as follows: for the treatment group, the area of
brownfields—i.e., lots receiving E-designation or ERD for hazardous materials—
that received a building permit on year X in rezoned area Y, divided by the total area
of brownfields in rezoned area Y. The same approach is used for the control group,
that is, the area of non-brownfields that received a building permit on year X in
rezoned area Y divided by the total area of non-brownfields in rezoned area Y. The
Appendix provides further detail on how redevelopment rates are calculated.273
267

See supra Section I.B.1.
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 11-15 (“The designation (E) or an environmental
restrictive declaration . . . indicate that environmental requirements pertaining to potential
hazardous materials . . . impacts have been established.” (emphasis added)).
269
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
270
The analysis relies on a shapefile of areas rezoned between 2002 and 2016, which
constrains our analysis to that period. However, roughly 80% of the rezonings to date have
occurred within that period of time.
271
This estimate was obtained using geographic information system mapping
technology.
272
Specifically, major alterations that will change use, egress, or occupancy.
273
See infra Appendix.
268
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3. Isolating the Effect of the NYC VCP
To make an accurate estimation of how the NYC VCP may have affected the
redevelopment rate of brownfields, it is critical to consider other factors that could
mask or distort that effect. Given that the variations in the real estate market are
accounted for because the control group is subject to these same fluctuations, the
main source of distortion could come from changes in federal or state legislation or
policies during the estimation period.
(a) Federal Programs
The most important federal brownfield redevelopment programs were
introduced in 2002 by the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act.274 The Act included legal protections for bona fide prospective
purchasers of brownfields and the creation of economic incentives administered by
the Environmental Protection Agency.275 However, private developers are not
eligible to receive these federal incentives directly; only state, local, tribal
governments, and certain “quasi-governmental entit[ies]” may do so.276 Therefore,
in the case of New York City, fluctuations in the amounts granted by the federal
government may affect the cost of maintaining the City’s programs,277 but they do
not directly change developers’ incentives to redevelop brownfields. The same is
true for the financial assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development: with very limited exceptions, the parties that are eligible to
receive these types of economic incentives are state, tribal, and local governments.278
Another important incentive for brownfield redevelopment was the
Brownfields Expensing Tax Incentive, also referred to as the “Section 198 cleanup
274

Pub. L No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601, 9604, 9605, 9607, 9622, 9628).
275
Assessment grants, cleanup grants, job training grants, revolving loan fund,
Brownfields Area-Wide Planning program. See Brownfields Grant Fact Sheet Search, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/bf_factsheets/ [https://perma.cc/S6HU-8ES6]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (listing the recipients of the grants, the state or territory in which
the grant will be used, and the purpose of the grant).
276
See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(1) (2018); see also id. § 9628(a) (discussing state response
programs and the assistance to states).
277
Insofar as the City could have been a grantee.
278
Brownfields Economic Development Initiative, supra note 190. The community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) “provides financial assistance to eligible cities, towns,
and villages.” Homes and Community Renewal: Community Development Block Grant, N.Y.
STATE, https://hcr.ny.gov/community-development-block-grant [https://perma.cc/M2L5FLSS] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program assistance is granted
to “public entities.” See 24 C.F.R. § 570.702 (2020). The main exception is the Sustainable
Communities Regional Planning Grant program, for which non-profit organizations are also
eligible.
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deduction.”279 This program was created in 1997 and discontinued on December 31,
2011.280 Therefore, some years when the deduction was active fall within this
Article’s study period (2002–2016). However, there is reason to believe that the
expiration of the Section 198 cleanup deduction did not have an important effect on
brownfield redevelopment in New York City. As EPA stated in a 2011 report, this
tax incentive was not frequently used.281 Actual usage figures for the tax incentive
suggest that, while it was more broadly utilized in New York City in the last few
years it was available, the number of lots for which it was claimed was small.282
(b) State Programs
New York State’s brownfield programs date back to 1994, with the creation of
the Voluntary Cleanup Program.283 In 2003, the State launched the Brownfields
Cleanup Program (“BCP”), which, unlike its predecessor, included tax credits and
liability protection.284 In 2005 and 2006, New York State’s Department of
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) adopted two measures that drastically
reduced the eligibility of New York City sites to join the state BCP. In 2005, DEC
issued a guidance document limiting the BCP to properties with high contamination
levels.285 In 2006, DEC’s new regulations excluded sites with historic fill—a type
of potentially contaminated fill that is very common in New York City—from the
BCP.286
The New York legislature also amended the BCP in 2008 to introduce caps on
the tax credits associated with the program.287 Because this Article’s estimation
strategy relies on redevelopment and not enrollment, and redevelopment takes place
after the cleanup, any effect of this legislative amendment on redevelopment would
be perceived, at the earliest, several months later (i.e., after the cleanup is
completed). For this reason, the 2008 amendment could affect the analysis in this
Article, which is based on a comparison of redevelopment rates before and after
2010. Given that the State provides information about the sites enrolled in the BCP,
and enrollment is necessary to be eligible to receive tax credits, these sites have been
removed from the sample altogether to minimize any effect that the 2008
amendment could have on the estimation of the effects of the NYC VCP.

279

See supra II.B.1.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVES GUIDE, supra note
182, at 3.
281
Id.
282
Analysis of Properties Claiming Section 198 Cleanup Deduction in New York
State (Feb. 5, 2013) (dataset) (on file with author).
283
DINAPOLI, supra note 250, at 1.
284
See id. at 2.
285
McIntyre et al., supra note 174.
286
Id. at n. 5.
287
DINAPOLI, supra note 250, at 2, 19.
280
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4. Results and Discussion
The performance of the NYC VCP has been impressive in various respects, as
enrollment and efficiency figures corroborate.288 As explained in more detail in the
Appendix, however, the empirical estimation suggests that the redevelopment rate
of brownfields in New York City did not increase in a statistically significant manner
after the creation of the NYC VCP.289 Given that enrollment in the program is high,
this finding is consistent with the theory that enrollees may be using the NYC VCP
to clean up and redevelop sites that would likely be selected even in the absence of
this program. These results, however, do not automatically support the conclusion
that the NYC VCP is not playing a valuable role. In fact, it allows the New York
City Office of Environmental Remediation to supervise the cleanup of contaminated
sites that may otherwise be redeveloped without government oversight. It is
important to note, however, that many of the sites enrolled in the NYC VCP would
be subject to governmental control anyway given that the majority of these
properties are E-designated or have received an ERD, which means they cannot
receive a building permit without the environmental agency’s prior approval.290
The reason why the NYC VCP may not be increasing the redevelopment rate
of brownfields is likely to be related, at least in part, to the structure of its incentives.
As explained at length below, the NYC VCP offers a covenant not to sue, but does
not provide the type of stronger liability protections that some state programs—
including New York State—afford their participants.291 The relative weakness of the
NYC VCP covenant may deter risk-averse developers from targeting certain types
of brownfields. Moreover, the economic incentives granted by the City are
substantially lower than those that the State offers to the participants in its state-level
VCP. As a result, the NYC VCP subsidies may be insufficient to cover a
consequential portion of the investigation and cleanup costs at many contaminated
sites.
V. BROADER LESSONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
One could conclude this Article with the analysis in Parts III and IV. While this
analysis alone would be useful to policymakers, it would miss an opportunity to
suggest solutions and advance the conversation on issues that arise in other areas of
the law.292 This Part uses the insights obtained through the analysis of NYC’s VCP
288

See supra Section IV.B.
See Appendix.
290
See supra Section IV.C.1 and accompanying discussion.
291
See infra Section V.B.
292
See Robert L. Fischman & Lydia Barbash-Riley, Empirical Environmental
Scholarship, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 767, 769 (2018) (pointing out, after a careful analysis of
dozens of law review articles, that legal environmental scholarship often fails at providing
useful policy recommendations that go beyond the identification of problems).
289
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to propose a set of policy recommendations that apply broadly to voluntary programs
and other third-generation tools.
A. Making Regulatory Programs More Effective: The Need for More
Comprehensive Data Collection
Consistently with what numerous adaptive management scholars have stated,293
Parts III and IV of this Article strongly suggest that policymakers’ ability to improve
government programs is tied to how well they can evaluate the success of these
programs.294 However, one of the most common obstacles to assessing the
performance of a government program is the lack of sufficient high-quality data.295
Examples of how information gaps can complicate the resolution of environmental
problems abound. Some of the difficulties in dealing with nonpoint sources of water
pollution, for instance, are a result of insufficient data on the origin, amounts, and
nature of this type of diffuse contamination.296
As explained below, in the brownfield context, creating accurate and up-to-date
inventories of the sources and location of contaminated sites is of crucial importance.
However, the quality of these inventories matters. In a 2002 amendment to
CERCLA, Congress created several financial incentives for brownfield
redevelopment but conditioned states’ eligibility to receive certain federal grants on
the inclusion of a “[t]imely survey and inventory of brownfield sites in the State” in
the states’ cleanup programs.297 The problem with the 2002 amendment was that

293

See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2014) (explaining that agencies should
have monitoring tools and other assessment methods in place to be able to evaluate their
programs); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 424, 429 (2010) (pointing out that “management policy must put a premium on
collecting information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring outcomes, using
new information to adjust existing approaches”).
294
See supra Sections III.B., IV.B.
295
See supra Section III.B (noting that without enough information about the location
of brownfields, it is not possible to assess the success of VCPs); Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2011) (highlighting
that the feasibility of adaptive management lies on the availability of information).
296
See Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail:
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 31–32 (2002); REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY,
supra note 105, at 605.
297
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. 107118, 115 Stat. 2356, 2376 (2002); see 42 U.S.C. § 9628(a)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2018) (discussing
assistance to States in the form of federal grants and the elements of a State response program
including the timely survey and inventory of brownfield sites in the State).
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“taking reasonable steps” to create an inventory also sufficed to qualify for these
CERCLA grants.298
This lenient standard that required states to merely take reasonable steps
towards creating inventories led to the brownfield lists that can barely be considered
an inventory. Vermont’s list, for example, contains 176 active sites in the entire state
as of April 2020.299 Connecticut’s inventory only includes sites that have received
state or EPA grants or loans and sites that are enrolled in any of the state liability
relief programs.300 In other words, Connecticut’s and Vermont’s inventories are
compilations of other lists of brownfields, and they do not include the most
important sites: contaminated properties that are not yet taking advantage of any
program and that could be good candidates for redevelopment in the future. In
defense of these states, it must be acknowledged that the challenge of creating more
comprehensive inventories is that identifying and assessing contaminated sites is a
laborious and expensive task.
Despite how cumbersome creating inventories of the sources and location of
brownfields can be, there are three main reasons why these types of inventories can
be very valuable—as long as they are comprehensive and accurate. The most
straightforward advantage of brownfield inventories is that they allow policymakers,
community groups, developers, and the public to know the location of the
brownfields in a given jurisdiction, allowing them the potential to minimize any
negative health impacts.
Of course, the utility of this information will also depend on how
comprehensive the inventory is. Lists of brownfields that merely include
information already available elsewhere—as with Connecticut’s inventory—may be
convenient but are not contributing to the identification of new brownfield sites.
New York City is a good example of how to go beyond merely unifying existing
lists. The City’s Searchable Property Environmental E-Database (“SPEED”)
provides access to a variety of environmental remediation information.301 This
database includes data from state and federal databases, but it also offers additional
information. SPEED includes a map that contains a layer with vacant properties,
specifying which of these lots are likely to present potentially contaminated fill
298

42 U.S.C. § 9628(a)(1)(A)(i). Section 104(k) of CERCLA authorized grants that can
be used to create these inventories. Id. § 9604(k)(2).
299
See Vermont Environmental Research Tool: Brownfield Site List, VT. OFF. ST.
WEBSITE: AGENCY OF NAT. RES., https://anrweb.vt.gov/DEC/ERT/Brownfields.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7CFW-36QT] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (this number excludes those sites
that have already obtained a certificate of completion or where no further action is
contemplated).
300
See Connecticut Brownfields Inventory, CONN. OFF. ST. WEBSITE: DEP’T OF ENERGY
& ENVTL. PROT., http://www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=2715&q=488996 [https://perma.
cc/KN8T-UPDV] (last updated Oct. 25, 2019).
301
See SPEED: Welcome to the SPEED Portal Help, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL.
REMEDIATION,
https://maps.nyc.gov/moer/speed/help/public/SPEED_Portal_Help.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RHG-ULSV] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
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material.302 More remarkably, this database includes information about sites with a
potential presence of hazardous substances, regardless of whether they are vacant or
not.303
The second advantage of creating comprehensive inventories of brownfields is
that they can be instrumental in evaluating the success of VCPs. As explained in
Section III.B, assessing the performance of VCPs requires having data that will
allow a comparison of the pre- and post-program brownfield redevelopment trends.
Comprehensive inventories can provide this information. For example, the list of
potentially contaminated sites that New York City has been updating since the 1980s
is what made it possible for the author of this Article to evaluate the effects of the
NYC VCP. Another shortcoming of most brownfield lists is that they typically do
not include properties that are not enrolled in a cleanup program.304 Non-enrolled
sites could include brownfields or non-brownfields. As the empirical analysis in Part
IV shows, this distinction is critical to be able to differentiate between the control
and treatment groups,305 and account for the distortive effect that general variations
in real estate development trends could have on the analysis of a particular
program.306 Comprehensive inventories such as New York City’s SPEED solve this
issue by also including sites that are not enrolled in any cleanup program and further
specifying whether the sites are likely to be contaminated (e.g., properties that hosted
manufacturing uses in the past).
Third, comprehensive brownfield inventories can be key to ensuring broader
supervision of cleanups by agencies. When a contaminated property is not part of an
inventory, and thus not a known brownfield, developers often find themselves in a
position to choose between two options. One option is cleaning the property up
under the supervision of a government agency—perhaps by enrolling in a VCP—
and the other option is to conduct a so-called “at risk” cleanup, which is not
government-supervised.307 By identifying previously unknown brownfields,
comprehensive brownfield inventories can increase the number of supervised
cleanups. This is especially so when a comprehensive inventory is coupled with a
mechanism that prevents the reuse or redevelopment of the property until the agency
administering the program considers that the site can be safely used for its intended
302

SPEED: Layer Control Panel: Glossary: VPD Fill Properties, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL.
REMEDIATION,
https://maps.nyc.gov/moer/speed/help/public/SPEED_Portal_Help.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RHG-ULSV] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
303
As explained in Part IV, these are properties that have received hazardous materials
E-designations or environmental restrictive declarations. See supra Section IV.C.1.
304
See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text.
305
See supra Section IV.C.1 (describing how the control and treatment groups were
defined).
306
See supra Section IV.C.3 (explaining how these distortive effects were addressed in
the empirical estimation).
307
McIntyre, supra note 165, at 435. In NYC most cleanups may actually be performed
“at-risk.” See id. (“[T]he number of at-risk cleanups routinely conducted in the city dwarfs
the number of cleanups overseen by state regulators.”).
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purpose—usually by finding that the property has been remediated or because
cleanup is not necessary.
This raises the following question: how does an agency implement the agency
review mechanism? At least two alternatives are possible. One option is to withhold
building permits for sites that are included in the inventory. The agency can then lift
this prohibition when it is satisfied with the cleanup or with documentation showing
that the site is either not contaminated or has levels of contamination that are
compatible with the future use of the property.308 Another option is to require similar
assurances when a new owner or operator intends to acquire control of the site. Socalled “transfer laws” have adopted this type of approach by relying on the former
use of the property instead of on brownfield inventories to identify the sites to which
the policy applies. For example, under New Jersey’s Industrial Site Recovery Act,
owners or operators of “industrial establishments” may not transfer their property
until it has been remediated or the agency has granted permission to proceed with
the transaction.309
While both of these alternatives provide an avenue to ensure that a government
agency supervises the cleanups, both approaches are also most effective when they
rely on the information provided by a comprehensive inventory of contaminated
properties. A strategy requiring the investigation of sites based solely on whether it
had a particular prior use—often industrial, as some transfer laws do310—would be
overlooking many other types of potentially contaminated properties (e.g., those
polluted as a result of commercial activities such as dry cleaning or lots that were
contaminated by fill material containing hazardous substances).311
********
In sum, having more accurate and comprehensive data about environmental
risks is of great importance. In some cases, knowing more about the location of
environmental hazards can help citizens reduce their exposure. Just as importantly,
by allowing for more thorough assessments of the performance of government
initiatives, this information can play a crucial role in improving regulatory programs
and implementing them more effectively.

308

This is the approach adopted by New York City with its E-designation program. See
Larry Schnapf, Property Contamination and Its Impact on Commercial Leasing in NYC, 88
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 32, 33–35 (Feb. 2016).
309
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9(a), (b)(1)–(2) (West 2019). See generally LARRY
SCHNAPF, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY - BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT § 7.03 (2015) (providing a thorough analysis of the
disclosure and transfer requirements in the New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery Act).
310
See SCHNAPF, supra note 309.
311
For example, properties affected by the migration of off-site contaminants or sites
with underground storage tanks.
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B. Lessons for Environmental Federalism: Improving the Integration
Between State and Local Programs
Determining which level of government is best positioned to address a given
environmental issue is a challenging task. Those in favor of a centralized model have
cautioned against the dangers of state or local level regulation—pointing to race-tothe-bottom or agency capture concerns.312 Proponents of a decentralized approach
to environmental regulation, on the other hand, have noted that state and local
agencies tend to be closer to the problems and, as a result, are in a better position to
tailor their programs to state or local conditions.313 Other scholars have posited that
complex environmental issues need the involvement of various levels of
government, in what they have referred to as “cooperative federalism,” “cooperative
localism,” or other monikers.314
This Article makes two important contributions to this ongoing debate. First, as
Part IV illustrates, the argument that tailoring programs to local conditions can
justify a strong local role is especially justified in the context of VCPs. The need for
local regulation can arise, for example, when state law creates a “local regulatory
gap.” As explained above, New York State’s brownfields program made certain
types of properties that were particularly abundant in New York City ineligible to
enroll in the state’s VCP.315 Without the creation of its local counterpart—the NYC
VCP—the owners of many brownfields in the City would not have had a voluntary
path to conduct agency-supervised cleanups in New York City.316
Second, even when multiple levels of government cooperate to address an
environmental problem, the success of a cooperative approach will depend on how
integrated the different layers of regulation are. The remainder of this Section
illustrates this point by first analyzing the challenges associated with integrating
312

See supra Section I.A.3. As commentators have explained, “[t]raditional capture
theory examines the extent to which regulated industries have captured their regulators.”
Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34,
49 (1993).
313
Adler, supra note 24, at 137 (noting the advantage that states have over the federal
government when tailoring policies to local conditions); Davidson, supra note 20, at 1034
n.47 (“[E]nvironmental protection is increasingly a local government issue.”); Nolon, supra
note 25, at 415 (“The diversity of local conditions . . . suggests that centralized approaches
to environmental protection are not necessarily desirable when dealing with environmental
problems.”).
314
See Davidson, supra note 20, at 960 (using the term “cooperative localism”); Daniel
C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1554 (1999)
(“The fact that environmental protection involves problems at various levels makes
necessary a multi-tier regulatory structure with appropriate entities at the local, state, federal,
and international levels.”); Snyder & Binder, supra note 20, at 247 (explaining that “a
comprehensive approach involving multiple levels of government” is necessary to address
environmental problems).
315
See supra Section IV.A.
316
See id.
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state and local authority to provide liability protections in the context of VCPs and
then suggesting strategies to navigate these complexities.
The NYC VCP is a good example of why local governments may not be able
to provide enrollees in their VCPs with an adequate level of liability protections
without adequate state legislation. Under the NYC VCP, sites that have received a
certificate of completion under this city program receive two types of assurances.
First, the City will not require further investigation or remediation at these sites,
subject to certain exceptions—if necessary to protect public health or the
environment, if the applicant committed fraud, or if there is a violation of the cleanup
agreement.317 Second, the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (“NYSDEC” or “the State”) has agreed—in a memorandum entered
into with New York City’s Office of Environmental Remediation—that it “does not
plan or anticipate taking administrative or judicial enforcement action seeking to
require a removal or remedial action” at NYC VCP sites.318 However, this
memorandum also states that nothing in the agreement “limits NYSDEC’s authority
to take action where it deems appropriate.”319
Given that, in general, the State is one of the most likely actors to initiate an
enforcement action with respect to a contaminated site, one could easily argue that
the protection afforded under the NYC VCP is not particularly robust. A comparison
of the NYC VCP assurances with those provided under the state program supports
this claim.
First, the memorandum of agreement between the State and the City notes that,
while the State does not plan to take enforcement action with respect to NYC VCP
sites, it still reserves the right to do so. In contrast, the state statute governing the
protections for state program’s applicants guarantees that the “applicant shall not be
liable to the state upon any statutory or common law cause of action.”320 Second, the
liability exemption for the state program’s applicants goes beyond the remediated
site and includes contamination that, while having originated on that site, migrated
to other properties.321 In other words, the owner of a site that receives a certificate

317

N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 24-906(a)(2), (b) (2019).
Memorandum of Agreement Between the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation and the New York City Office of Environmental Remediation
4 (June 7, 2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter NYC-NYSDEC MOA].
319
Id.
320
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.1 (2020). The statute includes certain
exceptions in cases of danger to public health or the environment, non-compliance with the
cleanup agreement, fraud, change of use of a property with restricted use, etc. Id. § 271421.2(a).
321
New York’s liability protection includes “statutory or common law causes of action
arising out of . . . contamination in, on or emanating from the brownfield site” that receives
a certificate of completion. Id. § 27-1421.1 (emphasis added). Participants, however, may be
required to clean up off-site contamination. This higher standard is applied because these
types of enrollees can be liable based on more than mere ownership of the site (e.g., they
318
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of completion under the state program will not be required to clean up off-site
contamination. Participation in the NYC VCP, however, currently provides no
protection against state enforcement with respect to off-site contamination.322
Third, the liability protection for sites enrolled in the state program has the
additional advantage of limiting third-party claims to recover cleanup costs from the
enrollee in the program.323 The provisions governing the liability of those who obtain
a certificate of completion under the NYC VCP, however, offer no third-party
contribution protection. The following table summarizes the differences in liability
protections between the NYC VCP and state program sites:
Liability to State (on-site
contamination)

Liability to State (offsite contamination)

Third-party
contribution
claims

State
Program

Full legislative
exemption

Full legislative
exemption

Reduced by statute

NYC VCP

Assurances in
memorandum of
agreement

No exemption

No protection

These liability gaps can discourage developers from pursuing construction
projects in contaminated sites.324 In fact, the evolution of federal law suggests that
covenant-not-to-sue-type protections—like in the memorandum of agreement
between the City and the State—are often perceived as insufficient. Before the
contributed to the contamination). See id. § 27-1405.1(a) (defining “participant” to include
parties responsible through other “statutory or common law liability” principles).
322
The memorandum of agreement notes that NYSDEC “does not plan or anticipate
taking administrative or judicial enforcement action . . . at a site addressed by this
Agreement,” i.e., sites enrolled in the City’s VCP, as long as sites remain in compliance with
the VCP and once sites receive a certificate of completion. NYC-NYSDEC MOA, supra
note 318, at 4 (emphasis added). Off-site contamination is not protected from liability, and
indeed the agreement directs the City to coordinate with NYSDEC regarding properties
where contamination came from off-site sources. See id.
323
A person who has received a certificate of completion is not liable to third parties
for costs related to the contamination that has been addressed at the specific site under the
state program. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.6; Larry Schnapf, New York
Environmental Laws Affecting Commercial Leasing Transactions, 88 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J.
30, 33 (2016). Obtaining a certificate of completion under the state program also protects
enrollees against contribution claims filed under CERCLA. See HLP Properties, LLC v.
Consol. Edison Co. of New York, No. 14 Civ. 01383 LGS, 2014 WL 6604741, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2014) (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 596
F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 2010)).
324
ENVTL. LAW INST., A GUIDEBOOK FOR BROWNFIELD PROPERTY OWNERS 8–9
(1999), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d9.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN69V2BK] (discussing liability and liability insurance for developers because of the liability
challenges they face).
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creation of the bona fide prospective purchaser protection, and also before it was
extended to tenants in 2018, EPA issued guidance documents indicating
circumstances in which it was unlikely to use its enforcement power with respect to
sites owned or occupied by these types of landowners or tenants.325 Nevertheless, a
legislative amendment later codified this policy to alleviate the justifiable concerns
that EPA’s guidance documents did not completely shield these types of potentially
responsible parties from federal enforcement actions, and offered no protection
against third-party claims.326
In light of CERCLA’s complex covenant-not-to-sue history, why would the
State be reluctant to provide liability protection for NYC VCP projects that is
comparable to that offered to the state program’s enrollees? A likely explanation is
that there were concerns about potential risks of a local government running a type
of program that had previously been administered at the state level.327 In other words,
such limited liability protection probably resulted from hesitancy about whether the
newly created VCP, run by an office that had just come into existence, would
adequately ensure that cleanups were sufficiently protective of the environment and
human health.
Regardless of whether limiting the scope of local liability protections was a
reasonable approach at the time or not, there are multiple reasons that support
reassessing the covenant-not-to-sue dilemma in the NYC VCP context. First, the
program has been in place for over eight years, and, to the author’s knowledge, there
have been no reasonable public allegations that cleanups conducted under the NYC
VCP were not ensuring the protection of human health or the environment. Second,
the cleanup standards and guidelines that apply to remediation carried out under the
NYC VCP are set by the State, not the City.328 Therefore, cleanups throughout the
state must meet the same standards, regardless of whether they are performed under
the state program or the NYC VCP.
Third, if a particular cleanup happens to be inadequate, the level of liability
protection that the state provides already offers enough flexibility to address these
types of issues. As noted above, the state still maintains its authority to require
additional investigation or remediation of sites in cases where the cleanup is “no
longer protective of public health or the environment,” the cleanup agreement has
been violated, the applicant committed fraud, or there is a “change in an
environmental standard, factor, or criterion.”329 Therefore, affording the same
treatment to NYC VCP sites with respect to liability protection would leave the State
325

See supra Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 (explaining how these defenses were
recognized by statute after a period during which EPA had provided assurances that it would
not bring enforcement actions).
326
See supra Sections II.A.1. and II.A.2.
327
This understanding is based on informal conversations with government officials.
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 13.
328
See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 24-903(d) (2020) (“Cleanup standards and remedial
selection criteria shall be consistent with standards and criteria applicable to the state
brownfield cleanup program.”).
329
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.2(a)(i)–(iv) (2019).
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ample opportunity to act if a cleanup conducted under the NYC VCP were found to
be substandard in any way.
Last, there are a number of benefits associated with expanding the scope of the
liability protections at the local level. Stronger protections from state enforcement
actions and third-party claims would be a valuable incentive for the redevelopment
of any site that is eligible to join the NYC VCP. This improved liability protection,
however, would be particularly advantageous for NYC VCP sites from which
contamination may have migrated to other neighboring properties. As noted above,
under the current framework, the State may require enrollees in the NYC VCP to
remediate off-site contamination. Increasing the liability protection to match that
offered to sites in the state program would solve this problem by protecting NYC
VCP enrollees against enforcement actions in these situations.
It is important to note that the proposed expansion in liability protections would
not necessarily entail leaving off-site contamination unaddressed. Even if enrollees
in the NYC VCP would not be liable for the migrated contamination, they would
still have to deal with the source of contamination, which would theoretically
prevent future releases and further migration of pollutants from the site that is being
remediated. Moreover, regardless of the level of liability protection, enrollees in the
program are going to assess the site that is being redeveloped and share the results
with the City.330 This process facilitates the identification of contaminants that
present a risk of migration and allows the City and the State to become aware of the
potential existence of a contamination plume that, without the involvement of a
developer, may have otherwise remained unidentified.
The analysis in this Section offers an important lesson that policymakers can
apply in other states. With regard to local programs specifically, if the concern is
that a newly created local agency may not be able to guarantee quality cleanups, a
possible solution is to grant liability protections in two stages. During the first stage,
liability protections could be more modest, for example, providing a level of
protection similar to that in the NYC VCP. If, after a certain period of time or a
given number of cleanups, the State determines that remediations performed under
the local program meet the necessary standards, the liability protections for new
enrollees could be increased to match those offered under the state program.
C. Efficient Voluntary Programs: The Importance of Minimizing Delays
While efficiency is desirable in any government initiative, this feature is of
critical importance when dealing with voluntary programs. Voluntary programs are
viable only if they are able to recruit a sufficient number of enrollees. In addition to
the financial assistance that the program may offer, potential enrollees also give
significant weight to the efficiency with which the agency runs the program.
330

The regulations require that an applicant submit a copy of the “remedial
investigation report and a remedial action work plan” to the city agency running the NYC
VCP. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1404.c.3 (2019).

854

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

As the analysis in Part IV of this Article confirms, running a VCP efficiently—
which includes, of course, avoiding delays—can be very useful in attracting the
interest of potential new program participants. Scholars examining this question in
the context of VCPs note that the delays associated with government approvals can
easily deter developers from pursuing brownfield redevelopment projects.331 Even
when that is not the case, if the programs are truly voluntary, developers’ willingness
to avoid bureaucratic delays can lead them to dodge the VCP and conduct at-risk,
unsupervised cleanups instead.332
How, then, can policymakers make their voluntary programs more efficient?
The analysis of the NYC VCP yields three very valuable insights to that effect. First,
as interviews with developers, lawyers, and consultants confirm, the agency running
the NYC VCP is very quick responding to requests, especially when compared to
other programs.333 Interviewees stressed the ease with which interested parties can
schedule a meeting with agency officials on short notice and, more broadly, the
swiftness of the different approvals that are required to move forward with the
cleanup process.334 This is one of the factors that may explain the differences
observed in Part IV between the NYC VCP and the New York State program in
terms of average time to cleanup completion.335
Second, interviewees have noted that the NYC VCP is very predictable and that
this strength has contributed to their decision to enroll subsequent projects.336 The
process starts with a pre-application meeting to discuss “the suitability of the
property for participation in the program” and other strategic aspects of the remedial
investigation.337 To make the process more predictable and efficient, the office
administering the NYC VCP provides a set of templates of the main documents that
the enrollee will need to provide throughout the process, which detail the results of
the investigation as well as the remedial plan.338
Third, participation in a VCP facilitates developers’ access to financing,
especially when the agency running the program supports enrollees’ efforts to secure
331

See, e.g., Bacot & O’Dell supra note 221, at 148.
See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 115, at 292 (explaining how “administrative delays”
during environmental reviews explained the low enrollment numbers in Ohio’s VCP).
333
The developers, lawyers, and consultants that were interviewed had experience with
other VCPs—at least with the New York state program and, often, with other states’ VCPs.
334
INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 5.
335
See supra Section IV.B. Another factor that may explain this difference, however,
is the lower levels of contamination present in sites enrolled in New York City’s VCP. See
supra Section IV.A.
336
INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 5.
337
14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1404(a) (2019).
338
NYC Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION,
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/oer/html/voluntary-cleanup-program/vcp.shtml [https://perma.
cc/E4JZ-6SJA] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) (“Each of the[ application] documents has a welldefined template, or boilerplate, that simplifies preparation and enables predictable and
timely navigation of the NYC VCP.”).
332

2020]

VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

855

it. Enrollment in any VCP suggests that a government agency is supervising the
investigation and cleanup activities. Mere enrollment, therefore, usually provides a
certain level of comfort to lenders. In some cases, the issue may arise that a
developer is seeking financing before formally enrolling the site in the VCP. This
may raise doubts as to whether the landowner will be able to enroll the property in
the VCP at all. To address this problem, the office administering the NYC VCP will
often issue a “pre-VCP enrollment ‘comfort letter,’” which shows the lender that the
borrower is on the right track and taking the necessary steps that will lead to the
enrollment of the site in the NYC VCP.339
D. Towards Simpler Regulatory Tools: The Brownfield-Renewable Energy Link
Professor Richard Epstein, in his seminal book Simple Rules for a Complex
World, claimed that today’s proclivity to make rules more complex has a negative
impact on “the productive efficiency of the society they regulate.”340 As shown in
Parts III and IV of this article, having intricate regulatory programs with many
different goals can also complicate the task of evaluating and improving them. This
Section examines these concerns in the context of so-called brightfields, the
increasingly popular idea of dedicating brownfields and other contaminated sites to
renewable energy production. Specifically, the question is whether cleanup
programs are the right tool to incentivize this particular use, or if making VCPs more
complex in that regard is undesirable.341
1. The Notion of Brightfield
Contaminated lands have the potential of hosting sufficient renewable energy
installations to meet most states’ renewable energy generation goals, and an
important share of these targets could be achieved using solar energy.342 To promote
the installation of solar energy technologies on brownfields, the U.S. Department of
Energy (“DOE”) and EPA launched the so-called “brightfields initiative” in 2000.343

339

Schnapf, supra note 308, at 33. The Office of Environmental Remediation also
issues other types of letter, for example, when the contamination levels at the site do not
require further action. See id.
340
EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 307.
341
See Bacot & O’Dell, supra note 221, at 148.
342
Jacqueline L. Waite, Land Reuse in Support of Renewable Energy Development, 66
LAND USE POL’Y 105, 105–06, 108–09 (2017) (including in this analysis “Superfund sites,
RCRA corrective action sites, Brownfield grantees, and sites that were identified through
EPA’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program,” and some “state abandoned mine inventories
and/or clean-up programs.”).
343
Lori Ribeiro, Waste to Watts: A “Brightfield” Installation Has the Potential to Bring
Renewed Life to a Brownfield Site, 8 REFOCUS 46, 46 (2007); see also CHRISTOPHER DE
SOUSA & THIERRY B. SPIESS, INST. ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS
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The term “brightfield” has been used broadly to include “a ground-mounted solar
array, a solar manufacturing plant, or a building with rooftop solar that is developed
on a brownfield.”344 However, brightfield is traditionally used more narrowly to
describe ground-mounted solar installations built on current or former
brownfields.345 This Section applies this narrower definition when discussing
brightfields.
One of the reasons why the term brightfields is primarily associated with
ground-mounted solar arrays is that, once a building has been erected on the
property, the decision of whether to install rooftop solar will generally not depend
on whether the site was originally a brownfield. As a brightfields expert has
expressed it, rooftop solar is “[t]he type of [solar] project [on brownfields] most
likely to succeed [ . . . ] [because] [t]hese projects have occurred without DOE
intervention [given that] it is fairly straightforward to install [a photovoltaic array]
on a building, whether or not on a brownfield.”346 With these projects, the developer
obtains the revenue generated by the building plus all the additional benefits of
rooftop solar. A ground-mounted installation, on the other hand, would preclude
property owners from maximizing the use of their property. The trends observed
with rooftop solar also apply to other types of solar installations that are compatible
with additional uses of the property, such as parking lot solar canopies. In these
cases, the solar panels do not negatively interfere with the use of the property as a
parking facility and can actually enhance it by providing shade to its users.347
2. Should VCPs Promote the Creation of Brightfields?
For the reasons noted in the preceding paragraph, a building with a rooftop solar
installation is often going to be a superior option to a ground-mounted brightfield.
A more important and thorny question, however, is whether, in the specific case of
CONSORTIUM, BROCKTON BRIGHTFIELD, BROCKTON, MASSACHUSETTS: A SUSTAINABLE
BROWNFIELD REVITALIZATION BEST PRACTICE 1 (May 10, 2013), https://brownfields.org.
uic.edu/research-results/documents/BrocktonBrightfield-finalforposting-May102013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38KK-KRGN] (describing the historical basis and coinage of the term
“brightfield”).
344
See Ribeiro, supra note 343, at 46.
345
See, e.g., Steve Goodbody, From Brownfields to Brightfields, SOLAR POWER
WORLD, (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2017/03/frombrownfields-to-brightfields/ [https://perma.cc/X78T-RNSS] (using the term to refer to a
ground-mounted brightfield in Billerica, MA); ROBERT HERSH, CTR. FOR PUB, ENVTL.
OVERSIGHT, PROMOTING SOLAR POWER ON BROWNFIELDS IN BROCKTON, MASSACHUSETTS
6 (2010), http://www.cpeo.org/pubs/Brockton.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ22-LQZP] (using
the term to refer to a ground-mounted brightfield in Brockton, MA).
346
See Ribeiro, supra note 343, at 49.
347
Parking Lot Solar Canopy Installation, EMPIRE: RENEWABLE ENERGY,
http://solarbyempire.com/why-solar/solar-options/118-parking-lot-canopies [https://perma.
cc/9DWL-N8E4] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
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contaminated sites, VCPs should favor brightfields over constructions with no solar
panels or vice-versa. There are multiple factors that can affect the relative
desirability of these two alternatives, such as the need for more distributed
generation in a certain area, its solar irradiance, the prevailing land characteristics,
or contamination type, etc. Therefore, there is no universal answer to this
conundrum. However, the following considerations can be useful when making
decisions about whether to prioritize brightfield developments.
First, neither brightfields nor non-solar constructions are better uses for
brownfields per se. Brightfields have the advantage of generating energy from a
renewable source, and constructions can host a virtually limitless number of socially
beneficial uses and activities, including housing, commercial, and industrial uses.
Thus, it is not surprising that various levels of government have created incentives
for many of the different uses to which a property—brownfield or not—may be
put.348 This has resulted in a particular balance of incentives for these various uses
in each locality. Even brownfield programs already tend to reflect the priorities of a
given jurisdiction—e.g., revitalizing low-income areas, creating more affordable
housing, or accelerating the cleanup of brownfields located in the floodplain.349
Second, it is unclear that the presence of contamination should, by itself, tip the
scales in favor of using contaminated sites as brightfields. One could claim that,
because ground-mounted panels do not typically require as thorough a cleanup as
other uses, brightfield development lowers remediation costs, making brightfields
the more economical choice.350 However, the savings are not always going to be
substantial. For one thing, a building used for industrial or commercial purposes may
not necessitate a complete cleanup either.351 For another, mounting solar panels on
contaminated land can present a variety of issues that may affect the total cost of the
solar installation.352 The potential for ground disturbance is a key complication that
348

These include, for example, incentives to promote new manufacturing uses or
housing. See N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., THE EFFECTS OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT (LIHTC) 1 (2017) (describing the basic features of the “largest federal subsidy for
the development and preservation of affordable housing.”); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 473, 513–14 (1991) (explaining the various mechanisms that many states
have in place to attract industrial activity).
349
See, e.g., 14 R.C.N.Y §§ 43-1417(a), (b) (2020) (providing higher grants for
development projects “on publicly-owned sites, at affordable and/or supportive housing” and
on “designated coastal flood zone[s].”).
350
See Warren, supra note 33 at 2 (“The nature of renewable energy projects is such
that they often do not require full remediation.”).
351
Under state law, commercial or industrial uses may have more permissive cleanup
standards. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 6 § 375-6.8(b) (2019) (requiring
different contaminant levels for residential, restricted-residential, commercial, and industrial
uses).
352
See Gil Hough & Chad Fairless, Brownfield to Brightfield Initiative in Oak Ridge,
TN 3 (WM2012 Conference, Paper No. 12346, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law Review);
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solar developers may have to deal with. For example, if contamination is present but
has been contained or capped through “solidification, stabilization, or encasing,” the
weight of solar trackers and transformers can lead to sinking, thereby compromising
the integrity of the cap.353 Moreover, the degree of ground disturbance that is
advisable based on the contamination at a particular site can also limit the type—or
affect the cost—of the solar installations that can be used on that property.354
Third, all other incentives being equal, brightfields tend to be more viable in
non-urban areas for two reasons: property sizes and access to light. The size of a
property can have a significant impact on whether a brightfield development would
be viable. Utility-scale solar energy projects, for example, generally require at least
five acres of land to produce one megawatt of power, which is the threshold to be
considered economically feasible.355 Some studies have situated the median size of
brownfields at 5 acres or more.356 While it may not be unusual for brownfields in
rural areas to meet these requirements, in densely populated urban areas brownfield
sites tend to be substantially smaller. For example, the analysis in Part IV of the
brownfields enrolled in the NYC VCP revealed that these sites have an average area
of less than half an acre.357
Unobstructed access to sunlight is another critical factor for the success of any
solar energy installation.358 For a brightfield to receive direct sunlight for as many
hours as possible, shading from trees or nearby buildings must be minimized.359 As
with the previous factor, the likelihood that a ground-mounted solar installation will
be viable is lower in more densely populated areas. Even in the rare instances where
an urban lot may be suffering no shading at the time the solar array is installed,
densely populated areas present a higher “risk that neighbors will erect buildings or
plant trees on their properties that shade the panel[s].”360
Although the relative undesirability of turning urban brownfields into
brightfields may lead some to think that incentivizing brightfields in rural areas may
Thierry Spiess & Christopher De Sousa, Barriers to Renewable Energy Development on
Brownfields, 18 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 507, 507 (2016).
353
Spiess & De Sousa, supra note 352, at 516.
354
Hough & Fairless, supra note 352, at 4–5.
355
See id. at 2; Rebecca R. Hernandez et al., Solar Energy Development Impacts on
Land Cover Change and Protected Areas, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13,579, 13,579
(2015).
356
Kris Wernstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado About Something
or the Timing of the Shrewd? 8 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 04–46, 2004),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10660?ln=en [https://perma.cc/G8LW-R4TZ].
357
Luis Inaraja Vera, NYC Brownfields Dataset (Aug. 2018) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Inaraja Vera, Dataset].
358
Waite, supra note 342, at 107.
359
Transforming Brownfields to Brightfields (B2B), ENVTL. L. & POL’Y CTR.,
http://elpc.org/b2b/ [https://perma.cc/G8LW-R4TZ] (last visited June 4, 2018).
360
Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different Light,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 853 (2010).
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be a better idea, market forces, brownfield redevelopment incentives, and the
existing regulations already tend to favor the development of brightfields in nonurban locations. In fact, most brightfield success stories involve sites in lowdensity—often rural or exurban—areas.361 There can be cases, however, in which
the balance of incentives for these different uses is disrupted. Some municipalities,
for example, have passed moratoria to halt renewable energy projects altogether
while they make the necessary changes to zoning regulations to better accommodate
these projects in the future.362 After these moratoria are lifted, additional incentives
may help these types of projects gain traction in higher density areas.
In short, this analysis shows that adding excessive complexity to VCPs to
promote brightfields over other uses can be counterproductive. Brightfields are not
intrinsically superior to other uses of land. Moreover, the fact that a property was or
is contaminated does not necessarily make solar developments more valuable than
other types of uses. There are areas—namely those with less population density—
where brightfields may be particularly appealing based on the need for distributed
generation or because the prevailing type of property where the panels would be
installed meets certain size or light exposure requirements. Existing incentives and
market forces already spur the development of brightfields in these locations.
Therefore, including additional mechanisms in VCPs to incentivize brightfield
development on brownfields should not be treated as the default course of action.
Default preferences for brightfields will often be unnecessary, and they will also
make voluntary cleanup programs overly complex and harder to evaluate.
CONCLUSION
In the current era of political polarization, voluntary programs are one of the
critical tools that government agencies have at their disposal to achieve a wide array
of goals. Unfortunately, policymakers often have a limited ability to improve
voluntary initiatives because they lack the data to perform comprehensive
assessments of these programs. This Article has shown that, in the few cases in
which such information is available, a great deal can be learned from the study of
voluntary environmental programs. This Article also explained the different reasons
why, despite its cost, obtaining better data on environmental hazards should be a
priority. The analysis of the first local Voluntary Cleanup Program yields additional
insights, such as the critical role that municipal voluntary programs can play in
361
See, e.g., HERSH, supra note 345, at 3–5 (describing development of a groundmounted brightfield at a site on the outskirts of Brockton, MA, a city 20 miles south of
Boston); Goodbody, supra note 345 (displaying photographs of ground-mounted brightfields
in several suburban areas of Massachusetts).
362
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY & THE ALL. FOR CLEAN ENERGY N.Y., ACCELERATING
LARGE-SCALE WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY IN NEW YORK: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2017), https://www.nature.org/content/dam/tnc/nature/en/document
s/accelerating-large-scale-wind-and-solar-energy-in-new-york.pdf [https://perma.cc/P54LNE5L].
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addressing local regulatory gaps. Finally, there are ways in which agencies can make
voluntary environmental initiatives more efficient and remove unnecessary
complexity in order to maximize enrollment.
APPENDIX: DETAILED METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Methodology
To estimate whether the NYC VCP has had an effect on the redevelopment rate
of brownfields, we use the following econometric model363:
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒-./
= 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- + 𝛽7 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/
+ 𝛽; 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/
+ 𝛽< 2𝑦𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- + 𝛽? 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2013/

F

+ 𝛽C 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2013/ ∗ 2𝑦𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- + D 𝛿.
H

F

.G7

+ D 𝛿/ I𝑜𝑟 + D 𝛿./ J + 𝜀-./
/G7

.G7

In this model, “i” is the index for lots, “j” is the index for blocks or community
districts, and “t” is the index for years. Only after a rezoning is there a chance that a
lot will be classified as a brownfield (i.e., the lot will be E-designated or receive an
ERD).364 In our regression sample, only those lots that were rezoned between 2002
and 2016 are included. The outcome variable is whether lot “i” in block/community
district “j” received a building permit in year “t,” which measures the redevelopment
rate. Brownfieldi is a dummy indicating whether lot “i” has ever been designated as
a brownfield during the 2002–2016 period. This dummy variable captures whether
the brownfield lots, regardless of having been classified as a brownfield or being
classified as a brownfield in the future, tend to have higher redevelopment rates
compared to the rest of the lots in the rezoned areas.
The control variables, Years before rezoneit and Years after rezoneit, capture
whether redevelopments are more frequent before or after a rezoning takes place.
The interaction term 2𝑦𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- indicates whether
brownfields tend to have a higher redevelopment rate once they are “discovered” by

363

I owe a special thanks to Wei You for writing the equation, running the regression,
and providing very valuable insights on the interpretation of the results.
364
See supra Section IV.C.1. (explaining what E-designations and ERD are and how
they are assigned to lots).
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the rezoning processes.365 We consider a two-year lag because, once a lot is
designated as a brownfield, it usually takes real estate developers approximately two
years to clean up the field before they can obtain a permit to develop on it.366
Post2013t is the time dummy that takes a value of 1 after 2013. We introduce this
dummy because the NYC VCP was in effect since late 2010. Taking into account
this two-year lag between the time that developers learned about the program and
the time they were able to receive a building permit for a remediated property, we
choose 2013 as the cutoff year. The triple interaction term, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2013/ ∗
2𝑦𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- , is the key, which indicates whether, following
a rezoning, a brownfield is more likely to be redeveloped after 2013 compared to
what it was before 2013. If the NYC VCP program is effective in incentivizing
redevelopment in brownfields, we should expect that 𝛽C > 0.
In addition to these controls, we also add neighborhood fixed effects and year
fixed effects, or the interaction of the two sets of fixed effects, as controls. By
including neighborhood fixed effects, the redevelopment rate for each lot is the
deviation from the neighborhood’s average redevelopment rate over the study
period. By including year fixed effects, the redevelopment rate for each lot is the
deviation from the city-wide average redevelopment rate in that year. In other words,
with both neighborhood fixed effects and fixed effects simultaneously in the
regressions, the outcome is normalized. We are comparing the normalized
development rates for brownfields and non-brownfields all over New York City, and
comparing whether such differences changed before and after 2013.
Alternatively, we also add neighborhood-by-year fixed effects into the
regressions. This is the preferred comparison as it is the most granular of the four.
Under this set of controls, the redevelopment rate is the deviation from the average
redevelopment rate in each year in each neighborhood. That is, we are comparing
the redevelopment rate of the brownfields to the rate of the other lots within the same
neighborhood in the same year. We adopt two definitions of neighborhoods:
community districts and blocks. There is a larger number of blocks than community
districts.367 Therefore, we prefer the econometric specification with block-by-year
fixed effects. Finally, in all the regressions, we weight each plot/observation by its
area.

365

Before they are E-designated or receive an ERD, private actors can also identify
whether they are potentially contaminated (and, therefore, brownfields).
366
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 12 (20.81 months on
average from the time the comment period starts). This is does not include the time needed
to conduct a remedial investigation which, in the NYC VCP, takes place before the start of
the comment period. Id. at 12 n. 47.
367
There were 13,748 blocks and 59 community districts, respectively, in NYC in 2016.
See Inaraja Vera, Dataset, supra note 357; MAXWELL AUSTENSEN ET AL., N.Y.U. FURMAN
CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2016, at 141 (2016)
(listing all community districts in New York City), http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_
2016_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWD8-6HAP].
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Results
Table 1: Main Results
VARIABLES
Years before rezoning
Years after rezoning
Brownfield
2-Years-Post-rezoning
Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning
Post2013
Post2013*Brownfield*2Years-Post-rezoning

(1)
lag2yrs

(2)
lag2yrs

(3)
lag2yrs

(4)
lag2yrs

-0.012
(0.059)
-0.013
(0.063)
0.026
(0.362)
-0.059
(0.152)
2.192***

-0.005
(0.059)
-0.034
(0.068)
0.165
(0.356)
0.208
(0.205)
2.073***

0.009
(0.189)
0.042
(0.046)
0.152
(0.251)
-0.085
(0.156)
2.176***

-0.023
(0.290)
-0.286
(0.584)
0.266
(0.236)
1.902
(2.065)
2.419***

(0.595)
-0.102
(0.361)
0.482
(0.713)

(0.579)

(0.500)

0.213
(0.809)

(0.492)
-0.066
(0.728)
1.198*
(0.650)

3,500,055
0.016

3,501,095
0.104

3,501,095
0.331

Observations
3,500,055
R-squared
0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.287
(0.633)

Table 1 displays the main regression results: Column (1) reports the year fixed
effects and community district fixed effects; Column (2) reports the community
district-by-year fixed effects; Column (3) reports the year fixed effects and block
fixed effects, and Column (4) reports the block-by-year fixed effects. Throughout
the four specifications, we see that the coefficient for Brownfield is small and
statistically insignificant. This suggests that lots that have, at any time, been
designated as brownfields do not have a significantly different redevelopment rate
than the other lots.
The coefficient for 2-Years-Post-rezoning is also insignificant, suggesting that
the post-rezoning years are not associated with higher or lower redevelopment rates.
However, we see a large and statistically significant coefficient for
Brownfield*Post-rezoning, which suggests that, after rezoning, the redevelopment
rate in brownfields increases sharply. This could be explained by the increase in the
value of the properties after they are up-zoned.368 The coefficient for Post2013 is
close to zero and insignificant, implying that 2013—approximately two years after

368

This entails a change in the zoning to allow higher-value or denser uses. See Upzoning, supra note 234.
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the creation of the NYC VCP—is not a year in which the city-wide redevelopment
rate changes discontinuously.
The main coefficient of interest is for Post2013*Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning. While we find that brownfields are much more likely to be redeveloped
after a rezoning, we are interested in whether such a relationship changed around
2013, which reflects the effects of the program. Columns (1) to (4) report different
results. The only significant estimated coefficient is in Column (3), in which we
control for the year fixed effects and block fixed effects. Under this specification,
we are comparing normalized redevelopment rates between the brownfields and
non-brownfields all over the city. However, when we restrict the comparison to
brownfields and their nearby non-brownfields within the same block, which is
shown in Column (4), we see a negative and imprecisely estimated effect. Therefore,
according to our preferred econometric specification, we do not find evidence that
there is an effect of the NYC VCP on the redevelopment rate on the brownfields in
NYC.
Table 2: Timing of the Effects
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Years before rezoning

-0.005

-0.017

-0.022

-0.023

-0.024

(0.282)

(0.287)

(0.289)

(0.290)

(0.291)

-0.265

-0.278

-0.285

-0.286

-0.288

(0.579)

(0.582)

(0.583)

(0.584)

(0.584)

0.267

0.267

0.266

0.266

0.266

(0.236)

(0.236)

(0.236)

(0.236)

(0.236)

1.850

1.875

1.897

1.902

1.912

(2.065)

(2.065)

(2.065)

(2.065)

(2.065)

Years after rezoning

Brownfield

2-Years-Post-rezoning

Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning

3.708*** 2.872*** 2.503*** 2.419*** 2.315***
(0.910)

Post2010*Brownfield*2Years-Post-rezoning

-1.813*
(0.933)

(0.685)

(0.586)

(0.500)

(0.461)
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-0.850
(0.718)

Post2012*Brownfield*2Years-Post-rezoning

-0.372
(0.666)

Post2013*Brownfield*2Years-Post-rezoning

-0.287
(0.633)

Post2014*Brownfield*2Years-Post-rezoning

-0.069
(0.660)

Observations

3,501,095 3,501,095 3,501,095 3,501,095 3,501,095

R-squared

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

0.331

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table 2, we examine the timing of the effect of the NYC VCP. While the
program was introduced at the end of 2010 and is expected to have an effect in 2013
(assuming that the reaction time is approximately two years), it is possible that the
effects of this program were felt before 2013 (if, for example, real estate developers
anticipated this policy’s benefits and prioritized developing brownfields
immediately). The effects of this program could also become apparent after 2013
because it may have taken some time for many real estate developers to learn about
this program. In short, it is possible that the NYC VCP was indeed effective when
we consider a different timing.
To address this concern, we run a second set of regressions in Table 2, in which
we experiment with different years—from 2010 to 2014—as the cutoff year.
Throughout Table 2, we include the block-by-year fixed effects, which is our
preferred specification. The coefficient of interest is on the triple interaction term.
We find that, except in 2010, there are no significant changes in the redevelopment
rate in brownfields following a rezoning in these cutoff years. In 2010, there is
actually a significant decrease, meaning that brownfields became less likely to be
redeveloped following a post-2010 rezoning than they did before 2010. In sum, there
is no significantly positive effect of the NYC VCP on the redevelopment rate on the
NYC brownfields in either 2013 or the neighboring years.
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Tables 3 and 4: Effects in an Area with a High Concentration
of NYC VCP Projects
VARIABLES
Years before rezoning
Years after rezoning
Brownfield
2-Years-Post-rezoning
Brownfield*2-Years-Post-rezoning
Post2013
Post2013*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-rezoning
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES
Years before rezoning
Years after rezoning
Brownfield
2-Years-Post-rezoning
Brownfield*2-Years-Post-rezoning
Post2010*Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning

(1)
lag2yrs

(2)
lag2yrs

(3)
lag2yrs

0.716**
(0.310)
1.656***
(0.607)
0.198
(0.352)
-1.725*
(0.964)
1.506
(1.220)
-4.433
(3.195)
1.182
(1.361)
83,674
0.019

0.978*
(0.568)
1.844***
(0.700)
0.836
(0.723)
-2.646*
(1.549)
2.095**
(1.012)
-4.466
(3.072)
1.520
(1.280)
83,674
0.081

-0.022
(0.550)
0.183
(0.607)
0.525
(0.613)
1.615
(1.501)
2.897**
(1.144)

(1)
2010

(2)
2011

(3)
2012

(4)
2013

(5)
2014

0.010
(0.550)
0.238
(0.606)
0.518
(0.614)
1.349
(1.530)
4.036***
(1.508)
-2.137

-0.006
(0.550)
0.222
(0.604)
0.516
(0.614)
1.312
(1.565)
3.740**
(1.507)

-0.022
(0.550)
0.182
(0.606)
0.524
(0.613)
1.625
(1.543)
2.889**
(1.302)

-0.022
(0.550)
0.183
(0.607)
0.525
(0.613)
1.615
(1.501)
2.897**
(1.144)

-0.022
(0.551)
0.184
(0.607)
0.525
(0.613)
1.606
(1.507)
2.919**
(1.129)

(1.696)
Post2011*Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning

-1.975
(1.604)

Post2012*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-

-1.014
(1.377)
83,674
0.384

-0.725
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rezoning
(1.561)
Post2013*Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning

-1.014
(1.377)

Post2014*Brownfield*2-Years-Postrezoning

-1.651
(1.370)

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

83,674
0.384

83,674
0.384

83,674
0.384

83,674
0.384

83,674
0.384

In Tables 3 and 4 we examine whether we can find a statistically significant
effect in the geographic area in which the program has the highest concentration of
enrolled projects. While New York City has 59 community districts,369 almost 25%
of NYC VCP projects are located in one community district,
Greenpoint/Williamsburg.370 Even in this community district, we find that the
coefficient for the triple interaction term is not statistically significant, and this result
holds true even if we use different years—from 2010 to 2014—as our cutoff points.

369
370

See AUSTENSEN ET AL., supra note 367, at 141.
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 7.

